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THE DISPARITY BETWEEN MEN AND
WOMEN IN CUSTODY DISPUTES: IS JOINT
CUSTODY THE ANSWER TO EVERYONE'S
PROBLEMS?
Over the past century, divorce has become commonplace
within American society. Few individuals have not experienced
the dissolution of marriage, either personally or through the tri-
als and tribulations of acquaintances.1 A couple's decision to di-
vorce, however, is merely the first in a long line of important
considerations they face at the end of a marriage. The most pro-
found of these, perhaps, is deciding who will maintain custody of
the children.2 A traditional cultural and legal presumption cur-
rently standing is that, upon marital dissolution, children should
remain in their mother's custody.! This presumption creates a
great disparity between the number of child custody awards to
men and those to women.4 The legal basis for this presumption
' See Richard A. WARSHAr, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION: THE FATHER FACTOR
AND THE MOTHERHOOD MYSTIQUE 17 (1992) (stating "[m]ost people have had their
sense of security shaken by a divorce or the prospect of one-if not their own, then a
relative's").
2 Statistics suggest that by the end of the twentieth century "half of all children
under [the age of] eighteen... will experience [a] divorce in their immediate fami-
lies." Christine M. Durham, Foreword to CAROLE A. CHAMBERS, CHILD SUPPORT:
HOW TO GET WHAT YOUR CHILD NEEDS AND DESERVES 13 (1991). In other words,
there will be many decisions regarding custody of children and what is best, both for
them and their parents. See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 17.
3 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 33 (observing that "[s]ince 1920, it has been
assumed that women, by nature, are better suited to love and care for children");
ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL &
LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 7 (1992) (asserting that "throughout most of the pre-
sent century the mother was presumed to be the preferred custodian of the chil-
dren").
4 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 33 (claiming that child custody decisions have
been dictated through the years by stereotypes concerning men, women, and chil-
dren).
'Two related assumptions underlie this uniform approach to child custody. The
first of these is that women are inherently better than men with respect to parent-
ing. Secondly, it is believed that fathers are less important to children than moth-
ers. See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 18. These beliefs comprise the so-called "mother-
hood mystique," which some argue, lacks a rational basis. Id.
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rests upon the traditional belief that children need their divorced
fathers for financial, rather than emotional, contributions.6 This
Note suggests the opposite; fathers play significant roles in their
children's lives and continue to be important after a divorce.
Therefore, to better their children's lives as well as their own, fa-
thers should receive custody of their children more frequently af-
ter divorce.
The number of divorced men who fight for child custody is
significant.7 Yet, there remain glaring discrepancies between the
number of divorced mothers and fathers awarded custody.8 Over
the past twenty-five years, the women's movement has been suc-
cessful in eliminating many staunch sex-role stereotypes and in
widening the sphere of behavior deemed appropriate for both
women and men.9 Unfortunately, such progress has lagged in
the realm of parenting, especially with regard to child-rearing af-
ter divorce.1 ° Fathers normally play significant roles in chil-
dren's lives, yet, in nine out of ten divorced families, the mother
retains sole custody of the children.1 The belief that children
belong with their mothers is firmly ingrained within this coun-
try's social and legal tenets.12 Such mores need to change, how-
6 See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, at 7; Jed H. Abraham, Why Men
Fight for Their Kids: How Bias in the System Puts Dads at a Disadvantage, 17 FAM.
ADVOC. 48, 48 (1994).
7 See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, at 99-101. Furthermore, a substan-
tial percentage of fathers who would prefer sole or joint custody do not actually re-
quest such custodial arrangements. See id. While over thirty percent of fathers want
sole custody, fewer than forty percent of those men actually sought sole physical
custody. See id. Likewise, roughly thirty-five percent of men would prefer joint cus-
tody. See id. at 99. Yet, over half of these men either request sole maternal custody,
or make no request at all. See id. at 100.
a See id. at 103, 300. In a study of 705 cases, an uncontested request for mater-
nal physical custody was made in 500 cases. See id. The outcome matched the re-
quest for maternal custody in nearly 90% of such cases. See id. In contrast, paternal
physical custody was awarded in only 75% of the 47 cases in which there was an un-
contested request for sole paternal physical custody. See id.; see also Stephanie B.
Goldberg, Make Room for Daddy, 83 A.B.A. J. 48, 49 (1997) (detailing the emerging
fathers' rights movement).
9 See Diane Eisler, What Do Men Really Want? The Men's Movement, Partner-
ship, and Domination, in WOMEN RESPOND TO THE MEN'S MOVEMENT: A FEMINIST
COLLECTION 50 (Kay Leigh Hagan ed., 1992) (stating increasing recognition that
men and women share same needs, goals, and responsibilities); WARSHAK, supra
note 1, at 14.
10 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 14.
'1 See id. at 14-15.
12 See id.; Goldberg, supra note 8, at 50 (explaining that the advent of the Indus-
trial Revolution forced men off the land and into factories, and required them to
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ever, to shield children from the heightened sense of grief and
despair they experience when their parents divorce and they
"lose" their fathers. 13
This Note asserts that joint custody affords all those in-
volved in a divorce a positive alternative, particularly for di-
vorced fathers who gain greater involvement in their children's
lives. Part I discusses divorce in general, presenting a brief his-
tory of divorce law and its modifications. Part II provides an
overview of child custody, including an historical glance at the
development of the present laws and standards employed, as
well as definitions of the various types of custody. Part III ad-
dresses fathers after divorce, their visitation, and the custody
awards to them. Part IV considers why fathers should have cus-
tody and the obstacles of sole custody agreements. Part V re-
views joint custody in broad terms. Finally, Part VI examines
joint custody with a critical eye, ultimately concluding that such
custody arrangements are the most beneficial.
I. DIVORCE
Divorce rates have reached a record high in this country, as
divorces have become increasingly available in the last twenty
years. 4 All married people have a right to obtain a dissolution of
marriage by the state-the legal process that terminates the
marriage. 5 Divorce serves several purposes: it "frees the parties
spend long hours away from their children).
'3 See WARSHAX, supra note 1, at 51-52.
14 See SUSAN NEIBURG TERKEL, UNDERSTANDING CHILD CUSTODY 27-28 (1991);
WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 15. Divorces were less common years ago because of the
difficulty in obtaining one. See TERKEIL supra, at 27 ("Today half the people who
marry and say 'I do' later divorce and say 'I don't.' "); see also Barbara Stark, Divorce
Law, Feminism, and Psychoanalysis: In Dreams Begin Responsibilities, 38 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1483, 1488 (1991) ("Divorce has become widely available in the U.S.... over
the last twenty years."). Stark suggests that the increase in the availability of di-
vorce resulted from demands made by citizens on the states in the 1970's. See id.
'r See Stark, supra note 14, at 1488. A divorce is not legally binding unless the
procedural requirements are followed. See id. at 1490-91. Stark suggests that the
states' regulation of marriage and divorce defines the relationship existing between
the state and family. See id at 1488; see also THE No FAULT DIVORCE GUIDE 5-6
(The Citizens Law Library 1979) [hereinafter No FAULT GUIDE]. The state has a
large stake in marriages as they promote the cohesion of family life; it has the
power to control, regulate and govern in this area. See id. at 9; JAN ANDREW,
DIVORCE AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY 44 (1978) (asserting that because divorce jeop-
ardizes family stability, society is entitled to curb divorce trends); see also ALASKA
STAT. § 25.24.010 (Michie 1996) (stating husbands or wives may maintain action for
divorce against other spouse). Some legislators and judges even see divorce as valid
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from the bonds of matrimony" 6 ; it divides the couple's property
between them; it arranges for support agreements; and it de-
termines the parties' rights regarding their children. 7 Typically,
the terms of a couple's divorce are determined through "negotia-
tion, mediation, and judicial intervention." 8
Before the 1970s, "divorce laws required a party to assert
[sufficient] grounds [for divorce] such as adultery, cruelty, or de-
sertion."9 Such "fault divorce" laws required the acquiescence of
the party who had not committed any acts comprising legal fault
only when it benefits the state. See ANDREW, supra, at 44-45. Grounds for divorce,
residential requirements, and costs all vary greatly between states. See id. at 46.
Some state laws are liberal, while others are quite stringent. See id.
16 Stark, supra note 14, at 1489.
17 See id. Determinations regarding a couple's children include decisions about
custody, visitation, and child support. See id.; see also WARSHAK, supra note 1, at
17. Dr. Warshak states that while divorce does provide for such determinations, it
is, unfortunately, rare that divorcing parents spend much time deciding where and
with whom their children will live, and who will be legally responsible. See id. at 17.
Instead, divorcing parents spend more time worrying about who will get the sofa
and who will get the compact disc collection. See id. This is because most parents
tend to follow the cultural presumption that the children will go to the mother, re-
gardless of other factors. See id. at 17-18.
18 Stark, supra note 14, at 1489-90 (internal citations omitted). Typically, the
final divorce decree incorporates the terms the parties agreed upon, as well as the
specific divorce conditions. See id.
Mediation, a method gaining popularity, is one way of reaching a divorce agree-
ment. A couple hires a "mediator," a person trained in facilitating agreements
among parties. This is a non-adversarial process, as the mediator does not take
sides. See TERKEI, supra note 14, at 39. A mediator tries to assist couples in avoid-
ing disputes by forcing them to focus on the issues of their divorce. See id. Mediators
cannot give legal advice, even if they have a legal degree. See id. Some argue that a
mediator's inability to give legal advice actually hinders the divorce process by
keeping parents from making necessary financial arrangements. See id. at 39-40.
Agreements reached by the mediation process are written into a memorandum of
understanding. See id. Attorneys receive and use such documents to produce the
final legal divorce papers and submit them to the courts. See id. at 40.
Typically, divorce agreements are obtained through negotiated settlements. See
id. at 38. In negotiation, attorneys from each side meet to outline the terms of the
agreement. See id. Both parties must compromise when negotiating the terms of a
divorce. See id. Such proceedings, unlike mediation, are adversarial and tend to
leave the parties less amiable. See id. at 39.
19 Stark, supra note 14, at 1490. New York, for example, only permitted divorce
if there was adultery "until 1966, when the law was changed to include mental cru-
elty, abandonment, imprisonment, and legal separation." ANDREW, supra note 15, at
47. Other grounds include drug addiction and frequent drunkenness. See TERKEL,
supra note 14, at 27; see also No FAULT GUIDE, supra note 15, at 9 (noting that a
couple seeking divorce under fault divorce laws was required to prove the fault of
one party and innocence of the other).
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before a divorce could be granted.2 ' This typically meant that the
innocent spouse received a more beneficial divorce settlement
than he or she might have otherwise. 2' The stringency of these
laws resulted in disrespect for both the law and lawyers, and
contempt for judges and courts.22 Fault divorce laws also fos-
tered widespread deception by men and women seeking divorces
who were unable to find sufficient grounds upon which to base
their requests.'
The confining character of fault divorce laws led states to
adopt "no fault divorce" statutes." Virtually all states now pos-
sess some variation of such statutes, making divorces easier to
obtain.' Couples must still state sufficient grounds for divorce
20 See Stark, supra note 14, at 1490.
21 See id.
22 See No FAULT GUIDE, supra note 15, at 10.
23 See id. at 10-11. People were primarily distressed by the fact that these laws
gave legislators and lawyers a hold over their personal marital relationships. See id.
at 13. Currently, practicing attorneys can recount the various schemes feuding
spouses developed to "catch" the other spouse in acts that were classified as fault
grounds. See id. at 10-11. The laws were so burdensome upon couples who had no
legal grounds but merely wanted to end a bad relationship, that they hired dubious
investigators and specialists to assist them. See id. These people concocted schemes
such as staged affairs to fabricate evidence so that there would be sufficient legal
grounds to obtain a divorce. See id.; see also ANDREW, supra note 15, at 47 (noting
that, in theory, a couple would have to have a state-imposed "ground" before a di-
vorce would be granted); TERKEL, supra note 14, at 28 (stating that couples without
a legislatively recognized reason for divorcing would often pretend fault existed at
the expense of public embarrassment). Fault divorce laws left unhappily married
couples with few alternatives and simply did not respond to the changing social
standards of society. See Stark, supra note 14, at 1492.
Furthermore, while fault divorce may have given the innocent spouse some
bargaining leverage over an abusive or philandering spouse, it also often forced an
innocent spouse to remain married to the guilty spouse until he or she agreed to a
divorce on the innocent spouse's terms. See id This was particularly restrictive for
women, and the fault requirements created practical, moral, and psychological bar-
riers to obtaining a divorce. See id-
24 See No FAULT GUIDE, supra note 15, at 11. The purposes of no-fault divorce
laws are "to strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage and safeguard family
relationships." Id. at 6. Such laws are also meant to promote congenial settlement of
disputes arising between the parties; to mitigate the potential harm to parents and
children caused by the legal dissolution of marriage; to make reasonable provisions
for spouses and children during and after litigation; and to make an effective law for
the dissolution of marriage dealing with the realities of divorce. See id at 180.
25 See, e.g., UNIF. DISSOLUTION OF MARR. AcT (1970); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
25-312 (West 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-106 (West 1996); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 170 (West 1988); see also Stanfill v. Stanfill, 742 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a court can grant divorce on grounds of cruel and in-
humane treatment); TERKEIb supra note 14, at 28 (acknowledging that incompatibil-
ity or irreconcilable differences are sufficient grounds for divorce).
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but, generally, these bases no longer require that one party be at
fault." Today, in most states, parties can mutually consent to
divorce or may dissolve the marriage for cause.2 ' Furthermore,
some courts now grant unilateral divorces. 2' No fault laws rec-
ognize that parties seek divorce for reasons other than a specifi-
cally-cited iniquity of one spouse, reflecting contemporary socie-
tal ideals regarding divorce and permitting parties greater free-
dom in ending an unsuccessful marriage.29 However, as divorces
26 See TERKEL, supra note 14, at 28. Statutory grounds are generally stated as:
1. Those which provide for dissolution of marriage upon a finding of irrec-
oncilable differences which have caused the irremedial breakdown of the
marriage;
2. Those which allow dissolution without regard to fault if the marriage
has become unsupportable because of discord or conflict of personalities
which destroys the legitimate ends of the marriage relationship and pre-
vents any reasonable expectation of reconciliation; and
3. Those which provide for the dissolution of marriage upon a finding that
the marital relationship is irretrievably broken.
No FAULT GUIDE, supra note 15, at 180-81; see also Hychko v. Hychko, No. FA 95-
032-04-66-S, 1995 WL 681303, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 1995) (stating mar-
riage may be dissolved on grounds of irretrievable breakdown).
7 See Stark, supra note 14, at 1490. Conventional "fault" grounds still consti-
tute sufficient reasons for seeking contemporary divorces for cause. Such grounds
include, but are not limited to, cruelty, abandonment, and adultery. See id.; see also
supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of fault).
2 See Stark, supra note 14, at 1490-91. Parties may obtain unilateral divorces
at the request of one member, without the other's consent, or any showing of fault.
See id. In comparing American and French laws regarding no-fault divorce, it is ap-
parent that the United States permits a unilateral divorce after a much shorter
time of separation than the six years required in France. See id.
2 See TERKEL, supra note 14, at 28. Reasons for divorce now include separation
(living apart), incompatibility (inability to get along), irreconcilable differences
(having too little in common), and/or irretrievable breakdown of marriage. See supra
note 26 and accompanying text (discussing grounds for divorce under no-fault sys-
tem); No FAULT GUIDE, supra note 15, at 43-70 (delineating grounds for divorce rec-
ognized in each of the 50 states); see also Ritter v. Ritter, 450 N.W.2d 204, 209 (Neb.
1990) (stating that court has discretion in dissolution of marriage proceedings);
Stanfil, 742 S.W.2d at 270 (holding that adultery, cruel and inhumane treatment,
and irreconcilable differences are grounds for divorce in Tennessee). No-fault laws
eliminate the need for witnesses, detectives, and testimony, as were required under
the fault divorce regime. See ANDREW, supra note 15, at 48.
Although no-fault divorce laws have primarily been viewed as an improvement
in divorce proceedings, there are some critics. No-fault divorce has been condemned
for depriving women of the only leverage they had in divorce proceedings, causing
them to settle for less money. See Stark, supra note 14, at 1492. Such laws have also
been criticized for treating men and women similarly in such proceedings, when, in
reality, they are not treated the same, and finally for contributing to the
"feminization of poverty." Id. Some say that this results from making divorce easier
and cheaper for men to obtain. See id at 1493. Stark asserts that divorce exagger-
ates the existing contrast between men and women's obligations in the family and
[Vol. 72:517
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have become more easily obtainable, the corresponding child cus-
tody dilemma has become increasingly complex.
II. CHILD CUSTODY
Probably the most important decision that a divorcing couple
must make concerns child custody. Involving facts and circum-
stances that are extremely emotional and personal, this is typi-
cally the most difficult divorce decision that courts must make as
well. 0 Unfortunately, however, parents and courts rarely spend
significant time contemplating what custody situation would
best enable the children to thrive; they instead succumb to the
traditional notion that children belong with their mothers.3
workplace, and increases their economic disparity. See id. She further suggests that
this results from the typical grant of custody to women, along with the attendant
circumstances of such custody and the impediments to their own career develop-
ment and advancement, as well as financial independence. See id. Men, on the other
hand, maintain some continuing financial responsibility to their children, which
usually tapers off, and they are rarely expected to assume a significant role as a
care-giver. See id. at 1494.
'o See Horton v. Horton, 519 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Alaska 1974) ("Child custody de-
terminations are among the most difficult in the law."); see also TERKEL, supra note
14, at 15 (discussing difficulties associated with custody decisions). As a result of the
numerous factors involved, most custody agreements take a long time to be devel-
oped-to reach a decision upon which both parents can agree and with which the
court, if involved, feels comfortable. See id. The development of these agreements is
prolonged because the parties frequently require assistance from attorneys or other
professionals. At best, by the time the parties sign the custody agreement, they have
thought a great deal about custody and visitation and believe that the agreement
they have developed is best for all concerned. See id. Not all parents, however, are
pleased with the final custody agreement. See id Often, parents may only have en-
tered into it because they wanted to end the arguing, or they felt guilty about the
divorce, and as a result, believe that they are not worthy of receiving what they
seek. See id. Others sign because they do not believe they will ever succeed in secur-
ing favorable terms, and thus simply surrender to the other's demands. See id.
Some couples never agree on terms concerning the custody agreement because they
are too upset or stubborn, or are simply ignorant about how to proceed. See id.
These parents typically seek judicial assistance in deciding what is best for their
children. See id. Fortunately, custody matters are always subject to judicial modifi-
cation, both before and after the agreements are made. See ANDREW, supra note 15,
at 49. However, courtrooms are not the best places for such arrangements to be
made. These are private and personal matters about which judges are likely to know
only what they read or hear from each party, voiced under trying circumstances.
Judges are often unfamiliar with a particular family's structure and the various
personalities of the parties involved. See id.
31 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 17. This traditional notion of the mother as
superior care-giver may be the most influential reason why there exists such a dis-
parity between custody awards to men and women. See i Since parents typically
subscribe to these notions, and believe that a court will award the children to the
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Child custody disputes can often become tugs-of-war with
innocent children caught in the middle. The term "custody bat-
tle" is frequently used to refer to the process whereby a couple
reaches a decision regarding custody. Such disputes pit parent
against parent to determine who is better fitted to raise the chil-
dren. The fact that a court purports to "award" custody suggests
that, in the end, there are winners and losers.32 Joint custody,
however, eliminates these emotional struggles, allowing both
parents to "win." Neither need demonstrate a higher degree of
parenting skill than the other, and the children maintain signifi-
cant contact with both-providing a more holistic life for them
all.
The parent awarded custody of children upon divorce is
charged with all responsibility and authority over them.3  This
parent presumably makes the majority of the "decisions regard-
ing the child's upbringing, schooling and discipline."34 Ideally,
the two parents should continue making major decisions regard-
ing their children, but the custodial parent alone addresses daily
problems. 5 Often the couple agrees between themselves as to
who will maintain custody of the children, eliminating the need
for court proceedings. Due to traditional notions of parenting,
however, it is generally the mother who retains custody.3 6 Yet,
mother, many custody matters never make it to court. On the positive side, this
tends to relieve the parents from spending a great deal of time and money. See id. at
17-18.
32 See Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 65 (N.J. 1981) (acknowledging that winners
and losers exist in such contests); TERKEL, supra note 14, at 23 (discussing how par-
ents who do not receive custody feel like "losers"); see also WARSHAK, supra note 1,
at 78 (discussing effects of labeling).
33 See FORDEN ATHEARN, HOW TO DIVORcE YOUR WIFE: THE MAN'S SIDE OF
DIVORCE 80 (1976); TERKEL, supra note 14, at 13; see also MACCOBY, supra note 3,
at 2 (discussing expectation of the primary caregiver before divorce that he or she
will retain sole responsibility after divorce).
34 See ATHEARN, supra note 33, at 80.
*' See id.; see also TERKEL, supra note 14, at 14 (noting responsibility and care
must be shared). Property is not the only thing that is divided when a couple di-
vorces. See id. The parenting of the couple's children is also split. See id. Although
one parent may have done more of the actual work of raising the children during the
couple's marriage, they both shared the overall responsibility for their children. See
id. This responsibility does not cease, simply because the couple is no longer mar-
ried. See id.
"6 See ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMEN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND
INSTITUTION 12 (1976) (stating traditional notions of women include beliefs that
they are "tenders and carers for the young, whether as sisters, aunts, nurses, teach-
ers, foster-mothers, [or] stepmothers"); see also Janet L. Dolgin, The Law Debates
[Vol. 72:517
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custody agreements are increasingly providing for shared cus-
tody and fathers are more frequently requesting sole custody of
their children.37
A. Standards Used in Awarding Child Custody
In early British and Roman times, fathers had complete con-
trol over their children.38 Children were part of their father's
property and performed services for him. 9 Upon divorce, fathers
were automatically given custody of their children who, it was
reasoned, continued to be property essential to their father's
livelihood. °
American society incorporated some of the antiquated ideals
of these ancient societies such as the presumption that custodial
parents maintain a possessory interest in their children through
the common law.4' Since married women in the eighteenth cen-
tury, however, did not yet rise to the status of separate legal en-
tities and thus could not own property, parental custodial rights
belonged solely to their husbands at that time." In addition, fa-
thers had a duty, as their children's protectors, to support them,
and because the father typically had the financial resources, he
almost always received custody of his children after divorce.43
Paternal support was premised upon the theory that in return
for such support, the father received the children's labor, thereby
the Family: Reproductive Transformations, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 37, 38-39 (1995)
(examining the changing roles of traditional assumptions regarding kinship); Carol
Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 377 (1996) (discussing
maternal separation); Cheri L. Wood, Childless Mothers?-The New Catch-22: You
Can't Have Your Kids and Work for Them Too, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 383, 391 (1995)
(asserting a standard examining previous patterns of care should be applied where
divorcing parents cannot reach a custodial agreement).
'7 See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 49. Dr. Warshak states that only a small mi-
nority of parents actually seek judicial assistance in custody matters because they
ordinarily succumb to the cultural belief that mothers should automatically get the
children after a divorce. See WARSHA-iE supra note 1, at 17.
38 See WARSHWA supra note 1, at 28-29.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 See Mary Kate Kearney, The New Paradigm in Custody Law: Looking at Par-
ents with a Loving Eye, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 547 (1996).
42 See WAMSHAK, supra note 1, at 28-29 (stating that the wages married women
earned at a job belonged not to them, but to their husbands); Kearney, supra note
41, at 547 (noting that married women were unable to act as witnesses or sign
binding agreements).
43 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 29.
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assisting him in making a living." In the rare instance where a
father was denied custody of his children, courts and society re-
lieved him of his duty to support, since he would not receive
consideration for doing so."
Absolute paternal rights to child custody after divorce began
to diminish, however, in the nineteenth century." During this
period, society began to recognize mothers as more capable of
meeting the "special needs" of their young children, as well as
the unique importance a mother plays in the early stages of a
child's life.47 This sentiment became known as the "tender years
doctrine," which courts increasingly adopted and employed in
custody decisions.
The tender years doctrine suggests that "where a child is of
such tender age as to require the care and attention that a
mother is especially fitted [sic] to bestow upon it, the mother,
rather than the father, is presumed to be the proper custodian,
unless for some reason she is unfit for the trust."' This pre-
4See id.; Christian Reichel Van Deusen, The Best Interests of the Child and the
Law, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 417, 417 (1991); see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who
Owns the Child?". Meyer and Pierce And The Child As Property, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 995, 1037-38 (1992) (discussing the theory of parental control).
" See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 29. The common law assumed that, because
fathers had a continuing responsibility to raise and support their children, they
should retain rights to the children if the marriage ended. See Abraham, supra note
6, at 48. This rule was criticized, because it had the effect of permitting men to leave
their wives, but requiring them to maintain their responsibilities to support their
children. See id. This perspective also suggested to women that, although they may
want to divorce their husbands for numerous reasons, they could not do so without
also 4iving up their children. See id.
See WARSHAX, supra note 1, at 29.
4 See id. In Clark v. Bayer, the court noted that as a general rule, mothers are
entitled to custody of their children:
[T]he father is, prima facie, entitled to [custody of his minor children], and
where he is a suitable person, able and willing to support and care for
them, his right is paramount to that of all other persons, except that of the
mother in cases where the infant child is of such tender years as to require
her present care ....
32 Ohio St. 299, 310 (Ohio 1877).
48 Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 684, 685 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981). Numerous ways to define the tender years doc-
trine exist. See, e.g., Wetzler v. Wetzler, 570 P.2d 741, 742 (Alaska 1977) (stating
that under the tender years doctrine "a mother will generally be given preference
for custody if the other factors are evenly balanced") (citation omitted); see also
Weaver v. Weaver, 261 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953) (holding that "[a]
mother, except in extraordinary circumstances should be with her child of tender
years" and "such a child will not be taken away from its mother unless it is demon-
strated that to leave the child with its mother would jeopardize its welfare").
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sumption ultimately established a maternal preference in the
twentieth century, where, absent a showing of unfitness, the
mother automatically received custody of children below a cer-
tain age. This policy eventually surpassed the paternal prefer-
ence in child custody awards.4 9
The tender years presumption was originally intended to
provide the mother only temporary custody of her very young
children, who needed a mother's special care during early stages
of development. 0 Once the children reached the age of four or
five, fathers regained custody.5 The doctrine was eventually ex-
panded to include older children, and mothers gained permanent
custody based upon the assumption that children of all ages
needed to be with their mothers.52 One explanation for this
change was the Industrial Revolution; family life changed dra-
matically when men began to work in urban factories and no
longer needed their children to work for them on their farms.53
Furthermore, as fathers began working away from home and
women, who were generally not permitted to work, became in-
creasingly unable to contribute significantly to the family's fi-
nances, a distinction arose between the roles of men and
women-namely that of men as "breadwinners" and women as
"nurturers."54 Concurrently, courts began expressing adulation
for motherhood in their judicial opinions, and increasingly
49 See Kearney, supra note 41, at 548. Kearney suggests that the tender years
doctrine was premised upon two basic assumptions, and that "a child's most basic
need is for a mother's love and care," and that mothers can care for their children
better than fathers. See id. Kearney further argues that the tender years doctrine
makes mothers' rights the focus of custody awards. See id. Mothers have the right to
raise their children because they have "an obligation to nurture [their] child[ren]
and [are] in the best position to do so." Id. at 549.
60 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 29.
51 See id. This form of the doctrine also took into account something other than
the parent's gender for the very first time. See id. It is unfortunate that courts today
do not continue to recognize changes in circumstances and children's needs. Some
children might actually benefit from living with one parent during one stage of their
lives, and the other parent during another stage. See id. at 30.
r2 See id. By the 1920's, the traditional preference for awarding child custody to
fathers had unquestionably changed to a preference for mothers. See id.
3 See id. At this time children were deemed less of an economic asset to fathers
and became more of a financial liability; as a result, fathers became more eager to
give custody of their children to the mothers. See id-
54 See id. at 31. Mothers stayed home with the children during these times,
while their husbands worked elsewhere. See id. Also during this period, a large fol-
lowing developed for Freud's theories of psychoanalysis, which proposed that moth-
ers contributed in unique ways to children's psychological well-being. See id.
527 •
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awarded children to the custody of their mothers."
Initially, the tender years doctrine was accepted by courts.
A West Virginia court held, in J.B. v. A.B.,56 that the tender
years presumption did not violate the Equal Protection clause of
the Constitution, and found a compelling governmental interest
based on the "sociological, biological and evidentiary" benefits of
a presumption favoring women in custody disputes.57 The court
further reasoned that the primary responsibility for maintaining
a home and caring for children rested with women, and therefore
pronounced mothers as better suited for retaining custody of
their children after a divorce.
58
Many courts and state legislatures, however, ultimately re-
jected the rigid, gender-biased, and typically unfair tender years
doctrine, in favor of more gender-neutral policies.59 The doctrine
See id.
56 242 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1978).
"7 Id. at 252. The court discussed various biological factors supporting the pre-
sumption for maternal custody during the child's "tender years." See id. at 253. The
primary factor discussed was the infant's "suckling stage," which the court found
created both an emotional and physical dependency upon the mother by the infant.
See id. The court rationalized that while the presumption affording mothers custody
is not perfect, neither is the use of expert testimony, an evaluation of the parties'
demeanors, or one of counsel's competence. See id. at 254.
8 See id. at 252-53. The court stated that although societal values may be
changing, and women may be working outside the home in increasing numbers,
there still exists an indispensable physical relationship between women and their
children. See id. The court then claimed that, when the societal roles of men and
women were reversed with greater frequency, it would then also change its deci-
sions regarding child custody. See id. at 253. Finally, the court stated that the pre-
sumption provided a "definitive standard," which was more reliable and mechanical.
See id. at 255.
Courts, however, have more recently stated that child custody laws should not
be applied in such an uncompromising and mechanical fashion. See Riddle v. Riddle,
775 S.W.2d 513, 516 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989); see also Thompson v. Thompson, 511
N.E.2d 412, 415 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (finding that trial courts must analyze who is
the primary caregiver); Commonwealth ex rel. Jordan v. Jordan, 448 A.2d 1113,
1115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (holding that courts must give substantial weight to the
primary caregiver, but "without regard to the sex of the parent").
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Michie 1995) (stating that custody of children
shall be made without reference to sex of parent); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(a)(1)
(Deering 1994) (requiring that a court not favor one parent over another because of
the parent's sex); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1998) (giving fathers
same considerations as mothers in determining custody of children, regardless of
age or sex); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1555 (West Supp. 1997) (abolishing tender years
doctrine custody preference for mothers); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101(d) (1996)
(stating gender shall neither give rise to a presumption of parental fitness nor a
presumption against a party seeking custody, and granting court's discretion);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.004 (West 1997) (defining "parenting functions" by
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is no longer followed in most states because its basis in stereo-
typical, traditional notions of men, women, and parenting ineq-
uitably disqualified men from fair consideration as potential cus-
todial parents." In addition, women's changing and emerging
roles in society also has had a substantial effect upon the abol-
ishment of the tender years doctrine. Women are no longer the
only parent at home with the children, and men have begun to
play a greater role in child-rearing. 61 Some courts do, however,
continue to recognize the tender years doctrine as a factor to
consider in determining child custody matters.62 Any continued
tasks and duties performed, rather than by gender); Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d
686, 695 (Ala. 1981) (declaring tender years presumption unconstitutional); Riddle,
775 S.W.2d at 516 (holding that the tender years doctrine is no longer recognized in
Arkansas); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 668 So. 2d 329, 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(finding that the tender years presumption was abolished by statute); Kuutti v.
Kuutti, 645 So. 2d 80, 82-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting tender years doc-
trine); Vance v. Vance, 436 N.W.2d 177, 178 (Neb. 1989) (finding tender years doc-
trine is not controlling in custody matters); State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350
N.Y.S.2d 285, 289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (announcing that "[tihe simple fact of being a
mother does not, by itself, indicate a capacity or willingness to render a quality of
care different from that which the father can provide"); In re Maxwell, 456 N.E.2d
1218, 1220 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (holding mothers in custody proceedings should not
be given preference simply because of tender years doctrine); Miller v. Miller, 474
A.2d 1165, 1166 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (noting that the trial court erred in employing
tender years doctrine); Woodall v. Woodall, 471 S.E.2d 154, 157 (S.C. 1996) (stating
that the tender years doctrine was abolished by statute); Murray v. Murray, 622
P.2d 1288, 1290-91 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (finding tender years doctrine undermines
statutory scheme).
60 See Kearney, supra note 41, at 549. This doctrine is criticized by feminists be-
cause it unfairly classifies women as "natural caregivers," incapable of performing
other duties. See id.
61 See TERKEL, supra note 14, at 52; see also WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 31-34.
(asserting that the rigidity of the tender years doctrine caused courts to treat all
families the same, when in reality they are highly varied; this resulted in inequita-
ble results in custody hearings and family situations).
62 See Howard v. Howard, 608 So. 2d 753, 754 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (noting ten-
der years doctrine was abolished but can still be considered if the child's age is a
relevant factor); Moye v. Moye, 627 P.2d 799, 801 (Idaho 1981) (limiting presump-
tion of tender years doctrine to only circumstances where all other considerations
are equal); Duran v. Weaver, 495 So. 2d 1355, 1357 (Miss. 1986) (stating reliance by
party upon tender years doctrine was misplaced); Seibert v. Seibert, 584 N.E.2d 41,
43 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (finding that the tender years doctrine, while no longer a
presumption, could still be a consideration); Shainwald v. Shainwald, 395 S.E.2d
441, 445 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990) (stating tender years doctrine is "one of a panoply of
factors to be considered" in awarding custody); Jones v. Jones, 348 S.E.2d 178, 179
(S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that the tender years doctrine is simply one factor to
consider in custody determinations); Ruyle v. Ruyle, 928 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1996); (holding that the tender years doctrine is but one of many factors to ex-
amine); Bah v. Bah, 668 S.W.2d 663, 666-67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that ten-
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use of the tender years doctrine, even as only one factor, how-
ever, allows gender to be considered in awarding custody.
Moreover, when child custody decisions rest in part upon gender,
fathers may unfairly lose custody battles as a result of firmly
held traditional notions.'
The rejection of the tender years doctrine led to the devel-
opment of the "best interests of the child" standard.' This stan-
der years doctrine is one factor courts should consider in overall determination of
child custody).
0 See RICH, supra note 36, at 12 (discussing traditional notions of women as
nurturers and mothers).
" See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 1996); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602(a) (West
Supp. 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(1)(a) (West Supp. 1998); LA. Civ. CODE ANN.
art. 131 (West Supp. 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(1) (1996); MO. ANN. STAT. §
452.375(2)(2) (West 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-224(2)(a) (1995); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 125.480(1) (Michie 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9(A) (Michie 1997); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(B)(1) (Michie Supp. 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-113(a)
(Michie 1997); R.W. v. D.W.W., No. 2950648, 1997 WL 37010, at *1 (Ala. Civ. App.
Jan. 31, 1997) (addressing best interests of child), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Ex parte D.W.W., No. 1961022, 1998 WL 81615 (Ala. Feb. 27, 1998); Wetzler v.
Wetzler 570 P.2d 741, 743 (Alaska 1977); Riddle, 775 S.W.2d at 515; Wagler v. Wa-
gler, 593 So. 2d 602, 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that the primary consid-
eration is the best interest of the child); Moye, 627 P.2d at 800; In re Marriage of He-
fer, 667 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (examining best interest of child);
Matthews v. Matthews, 633 So. 2d 342, 345 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that best in-
terest of child is paramount consideration in custody matters); Welman v. Wellman,
512 N.W.2d 68, 70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that it was in the child's best in-
terest to grant joint legal custody, but not joint physical custody); Duran 495 So. 2d
at 1357 (reversing lower court for using the tender years presumption and not ap-
plying the best interest of the child test); Hankins v. Hankins, 920 S.W.2d 182, 186
(Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the basis for determining child custody is the best
interests of child); Beran v. Beran, 450 N.W.2d 688, 692-93 (Neb. 1990) (examining
child's best interests); Risman v. Linke, 652 N.Y.S.2d 832, 833 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
(holding the best interests of children are served by joint physical custody);
Thompson v. Thompson, 511 N.E.2d 412, 413 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (employing the
best interest of child standard); Meigs v. Meigs, 920 P.2d 1077, 1078 (Okla. Ct. App.
1996) (placing child solely based upon child's best interest); In re Marriage of
Banier, 556 P.2d 1377, 1378 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (employing best interest of child
standard); Haag v. Haag, 485 A.2d 1189, 1191 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (stating all
other considerations are subordinate to child's best interest); Woodall, 471 S.E.2d at
157 (holding best interests of child are paramount to other considerations in custody
determinations); Anderson v. Anderson, 472 N.W.2d 519, 520 (S.D. 1991) (holding
that a party requesting a change in custody must prove that such change is in the
"best interest and welfare of the children"); Murray, 622 P.2d at 1290 (finding that
trial judge properly was concerned with child's best interest); Gurney v. Gurney, 899
P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo. 1995) (stating best interests of child are the most important fac-
tor); see also WARSHAIK supra note 1, at 31; Abraham, supra note 6, at 48; Kearney,
supra note 41, at 549; Alan M. Levy, Fathers and Custody Determination, 12 NO. 9
FAIR$HARE 3, 3 (1992); J. David Roellgen, The New Indiana Child Custody Modifi-
cation Standard, 38 RES GESTAE 44, 44 (1994); Van Deusen, supra note 44, at 419-
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dard considers numerous factors in attempting to ascertain
which parent will be the best caregiver for the children.' Theo-
retically, the court must put the interests of the children before
those of the parents, and in making a decision, disregard the
gender of the parents.66 Some of the elements courts examine to
determine the best interests of the child include: "(1) the emo-
tional, social, moral, material, and educational needs of the
child; (2) the home environment that each parent offers; (3) the
characteristics of each parent, including age, stability, and men-
tal and physical health; (4) the child's preference; and (5) the ex-
pert's recommendations."67 As previously noted, some courts also
20. 20 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 31-32. See also infra note 67 and accompany-
ing text (enumerating factors considered in best interests of child test).
6 See Kearney, supra note 41, at 549-50. See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-
101(d) (stating gender of party seeking custody does not create presumption of pa-
rental fitness or favor custody award of one parent over other); supra note 64 and
accompanying text (presenting case law and statutes regulating use of the best in-
terest of the child standard and rejection of the use of gender as a factor).
67 Kearney, supra note 41, at 550; see also IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (Michie 1996);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602(a)(4) (West Supp. 1997); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.312(3)
(Law Co-op. Supp. 1997) (enumerating twelve factors to consider in determining the
best interests of the child); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(C) (Michie Supp. 1997);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.010 (West 1996); Speakman v. Speakman, 627 So.
2d 963, 964 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (articulating several factors relating to the child's
needs and the parent's abilities); Wetzler, 570 P.2d at 743 (finding that the facts of
each case must be considered in determining the child's best interest); Moye, 627
P.2d at 801 n.1 (reviewing several statutory factors such as the wishes of the child
and parents, the parent-child relationship, the stability of the child's environment,
and the well-being of all the parties involved); Hefer, 667 N.E.2d at 1097 (stating
child's adjustment to home, school, and environment are factors to consider); Mat-
thews, 633 So. 2d at 345 n.3 (listing statutory factors such as emotional ties, capac-
ity, and disposition of the parties, continuity of the child's environment, and the
moral fitness and physical health of the parents); Wellman, 512 N.W.2d at 70-71
(listing eleven statutory factors to consider in determining the child's best inter-
ests); Ritter v. Ritter, 450 N.W.2d 204, 211 (Neb. 1990) (noting several factors to
employ, including the moral fitness and physical health of the parents, the continu-
ity of relationships, the child's own preference, and the ability of each parent to
provide for the educational and emotional needs of the child) (citing Christen v.
Christen, 422 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Neb. 1988)); Seibert, 584 N.E.2d at 42 (stating court
should consider all relevant factors); Haag, 485 A.2d at 1192-94 (applying several
considerations to the factual record to determine the child's best interests); Woodall,
471 S.E.2d at 157 ("The family court must consider the character, fitness, attitude,
and inclinations on the part of each parent as they impact the child."); Anderson,
472 N.W.2d at 520 (stating that all factors regarding the mental and moral well-
being of the child must be considered); Ruyle, 928 S.W.2d at 442 (noting that there
are many factors to consider); Murray, 622 P.2d at 1290 (cautioning courts not to
overlook any relevant factors in making a custody determination); Gurney, 899 P.2d
at 55 (finding the trial court properly considered which parent was the primary
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continue to use the tender years doctrine as a factor in determin-
ing the child's best interests.68 Judges possess a great deal of
discretion when examining these criteria, and it is ultimately the
totality of the circumstances that prescribes the award of child
custody.69
The best interests of the child standard appears to make the
gender of the parents immaterial, and seems to require that
courts more carefully scrutinize the welfare of the children.7 °
Such a standard is more flexible than the rigid tender years doc-
trine and employs a case-by-case analysis.7' It balances each
child's particular needs against each parent's ability to provide
for them. However, this standard is subject to the individual
prejudices of judges and mandates that decision-makers rely
upon their own values and ideals or those of "experts," in de-
termining which parent should receive custody.72
Another problem with the best interests of the child stan-
dard is that its subjective nature produces unpredictable re-
sults.73 Because judges tend to rely on precedent as well as their
own beliefs about the roles of men and women regarding parent-
ing, women still receive custody in greater numbers than men.
This judgment reflects the fact that society continues to view
women as the traditional, proper caregivers for children. 74 As a
caretaker, the abilities of each parent, and the relationships between each parent
and the child).
6 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing courts' present use of
tender years doctrine).
69 See Kearney, supra note 41, at 550.
70 See id. at 552.
71 See id.; see also Chorum v. Chorum, 959 S.W.2d 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
72 See Kearney, supra note 41, at 553 (explaining that judges may rely too heav-
ily on their own biases, or those of experts, in applying the best interests standard).
73 See id. at 554. This makes it difficult for people to rely on prior decisions
when preparing and presenting their own cases. See id. Because there are few con-
crete requirements, the danger exists that one's fate lies in the hands of the judge,
who may make seemingly arbitrary decisions or possess traditional notions of the
proper roles of men and women. See id. at 553. While child custody is a difficult and
emotional area, and one where it is important to examine each case on its own mer-
its, there may be some apprehension in leaving such a fateful determination in the
hands of one who knows the parties solely based on their appearances and testi-
mony in court. This may lead to a possibly fabricated and somewhat artificial im-
pression given to the court. It is, of course, important to leave room for judicial dis-
cretion, but too much room can be detrimental to all participants.
74 See supra note 50-55 and accompanying text (discussing traditional notions of
women in society); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and
Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 622 (1992).
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result of this misconception, sole paternal custody remains the
rarest form of custody award in this country.75
Courts may, and in some cases must, also consider the
child's preferences when making decisions regarding child cus-
tody.76 Children of sufficient age may testify in court as to their
preferences for custody,7 7 and in many states such preferences
possess great weight and must be considered in making custody
decisions. 78 Generally, such preferences are not controlling, but
9 See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, at 74 tbl.4.1 (pronouncing that in a
1992 study of 1,124 divorced families, 67.6% of children lived with their mothers;
15% lived with both parents on a joint custody basis; and only 9.5% lived with their
fathers); see also Howard v. Howard, 608 So. 2d 753, 755 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992)
(affirming award of custody to mother, despite findings of her lifestyle of immoral-
ity and misconduct"); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 574 So. 2d 832, 833 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990)
(awarding mother custody although both parents were fit); Milum v. Milum, 894
S.W.2d 611, 613 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995) (denying father custody, after weighing fac-
tors); In re Marriage of Dunkerson, 485 N.W.2d 483, 485 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992)
(awarding sole physical custody to mother, despite her financial and emotional
problems); Hankins v. Hankins, 920 S.W.2d 182, 186-87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (award-
ing sole ciistody to mother instead of joint custody where parents could not get
along); Wheeler v. Gill, 413 S.E.2d 860, 864 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (stating tender
years doctrine may be employed to "tip the scale" in the mother's favor, when both
parents are equally fit); Ruyle v. Ruyle, 928 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding lower court did not improperly award primary custody to mother in a joint
custody award, after weighing several factors). But see La Valley v. La Valley, 606
N.Y.S.2d 349, 350-51 (App. Div. 1993) (affirming award of custody to father, as he
was more involved and devoted to children).
76 See Sean P. Lafferty, Family: Review of Selected 1994 California Legislation,
26 PAC. L.J. 565, 565 (1995) (discussing California's requirement to consider child
preferences in custody determinations).
77 The age at which a child may testify in court about his or her preference var-
ies from state to state. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN § 40-4-4.1(B) (Michie 1994)
(fourteen years old); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106(7) (Michie 1996) (twelve years or
older). Other states leave it to the discretion of the court. See Rosson v. Rosson (In
re Marriage of Rosson), 224 Cal. Rptr. 250, 256-57 (Ct. App. 1986) (allowing ten and
thirteen-year olds to testify); Flaherty v. Smith, 274 N.W.2d 72, 73 (Mich Ct. App.
1978) (finding error in trial court's refusal to allow seven year old to testify). See
generally Cathy J. Jones, Judicial Questioning of Children in Custody and Visita-
tion Proceedings, 18 FAM. L. Q. 43, 58-68 (1984) (examining principles of child de-
velopment that courts should consider in determining whether children are mature
enough to have preference considered in custody determinations).See MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(2)(2) (West 1997) (directing courts to consider
child's preferences); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1)(b) (1995) (mandating court to
consider child's choice); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(4)(a) (Michie Supp. 1997) (stat-
ing wishes of a child old enough to form an "intelligent preference" shall be consid-
ered); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(A)(3) (Michie 1996) (requiring child's relationship
with parents be considered); Lafferty, supra, note 76, at 565-66 (discussing stan-
dards for permitting child preferences). See generally Jones, supra note 77; Howard
A. Davidson, The Child's Right to be Heard and Represented in Judicial Proceed-
ings, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 255 (1991) (discussing children's testimony in general).
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instead must be considered along with other factors. The use of
child preferences has been criticized because it requires that
children choose between their parents, which may cause them to
feel guilty, threatened, or pressured. 9 However, others salute it
because it affords children an opportunity to express their feel-
ings and desires regarding their own future.0
Courts also adhere to a doctrine known as the "primary
caretaker doctrine."81 Under this theory, the parent that was
primarily responsible for the children's upbringing and care
during the marriage receives custody.82 One court has defined
the primary caretaking parent as the one who has "tended to the
child's physical needs and has exhibited love, affection, concern,
tolerance, discipline and a willingness to sacrifice. "" Because it
is viewed as an unbiased standard that awards custody based
upon which parent accepted and fulfilled certain child-raising re-
sponsibilities and duties, this doctrine has garnered considerable
support from judges and legislatures.' Furthermore, the stan-
79 See Beran v. Beran, 450 N.W.2d 688, 692 (Neb. 1990) (recognizing that testi-
fying in a divorce proceeding can be traumatic to a minor). Others assert that cus-
tody proceedings become confused when the children's preferences are considered,
since children are typically "vague and indecisive" in such situations. See Lafferty,
supra note 76, at 566 (discussing new California law prohibiting child testimony in
custody hearings where emotional damage to child will be too great).
go See TERKEL, supra note 14, at 53-54; Don R. Ash, Bridge Over Troubled Wa-
ter: Changing the Custody Law In Tennessee, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 769, 794 (1997)
(discussing advantages of the child's preference doctrine).
8' Seibert v. Seibert, 584 N.E.2d 41, 43 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (stating that a par-
ent's role as primary caretaker is a relevant factor in determining custody); Haag v.
Haag, 485 A.2d 1189, 1192 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) ("[W]here the natural parents are
both fit, and the child is of tender years, the trial court must give positive consid-
eration to the parent who has been the primary caretaker.") (citing Jordan v. Jor-
dan, 448 A.2d 1113 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)); Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo.
1995) (finding that consideration as to which parent is the primary caretaker is an
important factor in determining the best interests of the child).
' See Riddle v. Riddle, 775 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989) (finding the
father was the primary caretaker where he prepared meals, dressed, bathed, and
otherwise cared for the child during the day); Figler v. Figler, No. FA-950374849S,
1996 WL 636479, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 1996) (noting that mother was the
primary caretaker because, for six years, she fed, clothed, bathed, and planned ac-
tivities for the child).
"Commonwealth ex rel. Jordan v. Jordan, 448 A.2d 1113, 1115 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982). This definition fails to recognize that both parents may exhibit these positive
characteristics in a more contemporary relationship, where both parents work.
See generally Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Re-
examining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year
Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN L. REV. 427 (1990)
(detailing the development of the doctrine).
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dard is fairly predictable and it ensures that the children's needs
continue to be met after divorce since the children will reside
with the parent who was primarily responsible for performing
those important tasks during the marriage.'
The primary caretaker doctrine is less discretionary than
the best interests of the child standard because it has some de-
finitive criteria. However, some suggest that it further promotes
gender stereotypes." On its face, the primary caretaker doctrine
appears gender-neutral, but in reality it may merely be a more
modern version of the tender years doctrine."" Although child-
care responsibilities are more frequently shared by both parents
today, in many cases, it is still the woman who performs the
majority of these tasks.' Therefore, judges typically find that
the mother has been the child's primary caretaker and award
her custody, even if the father also significantly participated in
the rearing of the child. 9 One analyst suggests that the primary
caretaker doctrine also promotes traditional gender-role stereo-
types by rewarding those women who decide not to work outside
the home by awarding them custody in the event of a divorce."
It also excuses fathers from fulfilling their parental commit-
ments; since they did not take on childcare responsibilities dur-
ing the marriage, they are free from performing them after-
wards, as well. In addition to excusing some fathers, the
doctrine also punishes others for doing what society dictated that
they should-work outside the home."
The primary caretaker standard also assumes that there is a
primary caretaker, which may not always be true in modern so-
8' See Jordan, 448 A.2d at 1115; see also Kearney, supra note 41, at 557-58
(citing Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 773 (1988));
Laura Sack, Women and Children First: A Feminist Analysis of the Primary Care-
taker Standard in Child Custody Cases, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 291, 302-03 (1992).
The standard assumes, however, that the primary caretaker has formed a closer
emotional bond with the children than has the other parent. See Kearney, supra
note 41, at 558 (citing Crippen, supra note 84, at 441 and n.53).
See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 51.
87 See id.; see also Haag, 485 A.2d at 1192 (recognizing that the primary care-
taker doctrine is a "sort of tender years doctrine in disguise").
83 See Kearney, supra note 41, at 558; see also Goldberg, supra note 8, at 51.
69 See Kearney, supra note 41, at 558. The primary caretaker doctrine also fails
to address how to award custody when the care-taking responsibilities are fairly
equally divided between the parents. See id.
See id. at 559.
S' ee id.
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ciety where both parents frequently work outside the home and
contribute equally to child-rearing responsibilities.92 This stan-
dard also fails to account for the child's relationship with the
other parent, which may actually be stronger than that with the
primary caretaker." Furthermore, the amount of time that a
parent spends with his or her children does not necessarily indi-
cate the quality of the children's relationship with that parent.9
Parental fitness is a final consideration in custody matters,
and is the one standard that permeates all the others. This fac-
tor attempts to ensure that the children will reside with the par-
ent most able to meet their needs and raise them in a manner
that will allow them to contribute effectively to society.95 In de-
termining parental fitness, courts examine several factors, most
importantly, the parent's ability to adequately provide for the
children emotionally, physically, and intellectually. 9 Courts also
evaluate each parent's sense of morality and determine which
parent they believe can better provide for the children. 9'
Parental unfitness means that there exists "a personal defi-
ciency or incapacity which has prevented, or will probably pre-
vent, performance of a reasonable parental obligation in child
rearing and which has caused, or probably will result in, detri-
See id. at 558.
93 See id. at 558-59.
See Levy, supra note 64, at 5. Many times, both parents act as primary care-
takers, but in different ways. See id. One may spend more time with the children
than the other, but both may provide the same quality of time. See id.
95 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(2)(5) (West 1997) (authorizing considera-
tion of the mental and physical health of the parties); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-
212(l)(e) (1995) (addressing mental and physical health of the parties); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 125.480(5) (Michie Supp. 1997) (denying custody to any parent who
engaged in acts of domestic violence); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(B)(2) (Iichie
1994) (examining whether parents are capable of providing adequate care for child);
see also Ruyle v. Ruyle, 928 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (employing fit-
ness approach); TERKEL, supra note 14, at 56 (defining fit parent as one who is
"healthy, mature, and capable of raising children"). Terkel also suggests that judges
examine each parent's own thoughts on how they discipline and indoctrinate values
in their children. See id.
"See Ruyle, 928 S.W.2d at 442 (delineating factors used to determine parental
fitness).
97 See Fletcher v. Fletcher, 526 N.W.2d 889, 896 (Mich. 1994). Courts must look
at the effect a parent's conduct will have on the parent-child relationship. See id.
The question is not who is a more moral person, but given each party's moral dispo-
sition, who can better provide for the children and their needs. See id. Terkel also
notes that courts will examine which parent is more likely to put the children's in-
terests before his or her own. See TERKEL, supra note 14, at 56.
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ment to a child's well-being.""8 Finding a parent to be fit does not
necessarily dictate that such parent should receive custody. In-
stead, the trial judge must choose who would be the better of the
two, or, alternatively, whether joint custody would be the best
option.99 Once again, inherent in such decisions are judicial be-
liefs and biases.
Today, courts have available several methods to determine
how to award custody of children after a divorce. At their own
discretion, courts may incorporate all or some of these consid-
erations into a custody decision.
B. Types of Child Custody
The most common form of child custody is sole custody.0 0
Here, either the mother or father is the sole custodial parent of
the children, while the other parent maintains visitation
rights.'' Under sole custody, the custodial parent has the right
to make decisions regarding the children without acquiring the
other parent's approval or consent.' ° Legally, the sole custodial
parent is responsible for the children's well-being, behavior, and
affairs.'
Sole custody is popular for several reasons; it is the tradi-
tional custodial arrangement and it perpetuates the traditional
98 Ritter v. Ritter, 450 N.W.2d 204, 210 (Neb. 1990). Extramarital affairs do not
necessarily determine a child custody issue, but such sexual conduct may be consid-
ered in the custody determination. See Fletcher, 526 N.W.2d at 896; Ritter, 450
N.W.2d at 210.
" See, e.g., Jones v. Ard, 219 S.E.2d 358, 359 (S.C. 1975) (stating fitness does
not guarantee custody); Bah v. Bah, 668 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that finding that a mother is fit does not automatically entitle her to cus-
tody).
'; See TERKEL, supra note 14, at 19.
101 See id.
'02 See id. One exception to the rule denying the right of consultation is that, in
some states, the custodial parent needs the consent of the other parent to move with
the children to another state. See id.; Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 906 (N.D.
1997) (discussing a statutory requirement that the custodial parent seek a court or-
der to change the child's residence when the noncustodial parent objects to the re-
moval). But see Cook v. Cook, 898 P.2d 702, 707 (Nev. 1995) (finding that best inter-
est of child would be served by allowing the mother and child to move despite the
father's objection).
10 See CIJI WARE, SHARING PARENTHOOD AFTER DIVORCE 16 (1982). This, of
course, means that the children must be appropriately cared for or the non-custodial
parent may go to court to have the custody arrangement modified. See id. at 15; see
also MICHAEL WHEELER, DIVIDED CHILDREN: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR DIVORCING
PARENTS 83 (1980).
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notion that mothers, not fathers, are essential parents. Fur-
thermore, most states, while permitting joint custody awards, do
not encourage them. Finally, some parents, particularly fathers,
do not request or dispute custody, thereby making sole custody
awards even more commonplace."° While sole custody arrange-
ments continue to enjoy great favor, in most situations it is ac-
tually detrimental to both children and parents. 5 Unfortu-
nately, however, until joint custody becomes a widely utilized
and encouraged custody arrangement, it appears that sole cus-
tody will remain the most common form of child custody, and
mothers the most common recipients.
As suggested, joint custody is another type of custody
agreement. Parents, judges, and child experts are becoming in-
creasingly aware of the necessity of having both parents involved
in children's lives; this can be made possible by joint or shared
custody.'0 Courts and legislatures define joint custody as "an
'"l See MACCOBY & MNooKIN, supra note 3, at 99 tbl.5.1 (noting that nearly 30%
of fathers surveyed did not want physical custody). Sometimes parents do not re-
quest child custody because they were not the primary caretakers during the mar-
riage and believe that after divorce their children need them even less than they
appeared to during the marriage. See id. at 102; TERKEL, supra note 14, at 19. Or,
these people may be too involved in their own new lives, careers, or families to prop-
erly care for the children they left behind. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 3,
at 102; TERKEL, supra note 14, at 19. Other times, parents are simply unable to care
for their children emotionally, physically, or financially. See id. at 19-20. Still other
parents, who did not assume large care-taking roles during their married lives, feel
that they would be overwhelmed and overburdened if they had to begin assuming
such responsibilities once the marriage is dissolved. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, su-
pra note 3, at 102; TERKEL, supra note 14, at 20. Some parents honestly believe that
sole custody granted to the other parent is the best situation for their children or
believe that there would be too many logistical problems associated with shared or
joint custody. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 3, at 102; TERKEL, supra note
14, at 20-21. Perhaps a parent's most persuasive argument for requesting sole cus-
tody of the children is the fear, unfounded or not, that the children will be abused by
the other parent. See id. at 21. However, all of these arguments ignore the fact that
joint custody arrangements, involving both parents, are often beneficial for the par-
ents and the children. See infra notes 319-50 and accompanying text (discussing
joint custody as the best option).
105 See Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 65 (N.J. 1981) ("Sole custody tends both to
isolate children from the noncustodial parent and to place heavy financial and emo-
tional burdens on the sole caretaker, usually the mother... .").
10' See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a (West 1995) (stating joint custody as-
sures that children have continuing contact with both parents); IDAHO CODE § 32-
717B(1) (1996) (recognizing that joint custody provides child with frequent and con-
tinuing contact with both parents); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(2) (West 1997)
(requiring that joint custody agreements afford children frequent and continuing
contact with both parents); In Re Marriage of Dunkerson, 485 N.W.2d 483, 486
[Vol. 72:517
19981 GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN JOINT CUSTODY 539
order that specifies either that 'the child shall reside alternately
for specific periods with each of the parents,' or that 'the parents
shall share decision-making authority as to the important deci-
sions affecting the welfare of the child,' or both,"' thereby creat-
ing two types of joint custody-legal and physical.'
In joint legal custody, the parents share the responsibility
and decision-making power over major issues related to their
children.0 9 Occasionally, the parents divide this control so that
each parent has their own domain in which to make decisions. 10
(Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (discussing legal preference for joint custody "whenever rea-
sonable and in the child's best interest"); see also TERKEL, supra note 14, at 21;
Shirani B. Ponnambalam, Relocation of the Custodial Spouse: Are We Really Seeing
a Change in Judicial Attitudes?, 19 WESTCHESTER B.J. 33, 40 (1992) (noting that
New York courts have a policy of awarding both parents maximum contact with
their children); Van Deusen, supra note 44, at 424 (stating that California's legisla-
ture declared it public policy to assure that minor children have frequent and con-
tinuing contact with both parents after divorce).
107 Wellman v. Wellman, 512 N.W.2d 68, 69 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.26a(7) (1996)); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.312(6a)(7) (Law. Co-
op. 1992)); see also Hychko v. Hychko, No. FA95-032-04-66-S, 1995 Wf 681303, at *1
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 1995) (discussing Connecticut's joint custody laws). In
Idaho, joint custody is defined as: "an order awarding custody of the minor child or
children to both parents and providing that physical custody shall be shared by the
parents in such a way as to assure the child or children of frequent and continuing
contact with both parents." IDAHO CODE § 32-717B(1) (1996).
108 Some states use the general term "joint custody" to refer to both joint legal
and joint physical custody. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3002 (Deering 1994); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(5)(a) (1994). Such usage, however, leads to some of the confu-
sion surrounding joint custody.
10 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-717B(3) (requiring that parents in joint legal cus-
tody agreements "share the decision-making rights, responsibilities and authority
relating to the health, education and general welfare of a child"); IOWA CODE ANN. §
598.41(5) (West 1996) (stating that legal custodian has right to make decisions re-
garding child's education, health, religion, and extracurricular activities); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9.336 (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.003(3)(b) (West
Supp. 1998) (stating that joint legal custody means both parents have equal rights
to determine "child's upbringing, including education, healthcare, and religious
training"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(5)(e) (1994) (defining joint legal custody as
sharing of parties rights, responsibilities, and authority regarding child's health,
education, and welfare); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(1)(1) (West 1997) (defining joint
legal custody as parents sharing the "decision-making rights, responsibilities, and
authority relating to the health, education and welfare of the child"); see also
TERKEL, supra note 14, at 23; WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 178.
It is also generally required that the parents confer with one another when ex-
ercising their decision-making rights, responsibilities, and authority, unless other-
wise agreed. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.336; MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(5)(e);
MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375(1)(1).
"0 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 178. For example, one parent may agree to
share decision-making authority regarding the children's medical care and educa-
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Under joint legal custody, both parents remain legally responsi-
ble for their children and their children's actions."' Courts typi-
cally employ this type of arrangement when jcint physical cus-
tody is simply impossible, or when the children or parents refuse
to cooperate in joint physical custody situations." Joint legal
custody affords more rights to the non-custodial parent than sole
custody situations."' Under joint legal custody, the noncustodial
parent may feel that he or she is more significant in his or her
children's lives, and may, therefore, be more willing to accept
emotional and financial responsibility."' Some argue, however,
that this type of arrangement fosters disagreement among di-
vorced parents and gives an "unreasonable" parent too much
power."5 Finally, while joint legal custody is an option available
to both mothers and fathers, it is still typically the mother who
receives physical custody.
116
By contrast, in joint physical custody agreements, the chil-
dren divide the time they spend living in each parent's home."7
tion, but insist that they be the sole decision-maker regarding religious worship. See
id.
1" See id.112 See TERKEL, supra note 14, at 22.
3 See id. at 23.
114 See id. Terkel also suggests that this type of situation helps to prevent non-
custodial parents from feeling like "losers" after a custodial dispute. Id. at 23; see
also Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 66 (N.J. 1981) (noting that joint custody enables
children to maintain their attachments to both parents by allowing both parents to
be decision-makers).
115 See TERKEL, supra note 14, at 23. Parents in such cases may then wish to
divide the decision-making authority so that each parent essentially maintains his
or her own realm of authority. See WARSHAE? supra note 1, at 178.
116 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 178.
117 See id. (addressing joint physical custody agreements). Joint physical custody
agreements typically mean that the children reside in two homes, one with each of
their parents. See id. If their parents live in different geographical locations and
school districts, such agreements may mean that these children possess two sets of
friends or even attend two different schools. See TERKEL, supra note 14, at 21. For
example, one statute provides that:
"[J1oint custody" means an order awarding legal custody of the minor child
to both parents, providing for joint decision-making by the parents and
providing that physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a
way as to assure the child of continuing contact with both parents. The
court may award joint legal custody without awarding joint physical cus-
tody where the parents have agreed to merely joint legal custody.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a(a) (West 1995); see also IDAHO CODE § 32-717B(2)
(defining joint physical custody as awarding each parent "significant periods of time
in which a child resides with or is under the care and supervision of each of the par-
ents"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(5) (addressing joint physical custody); MINN. STAT.
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Such arrangements may divide custody in various ways, but the
most typical type involves an approximately fifty-fifty split be-
tween the parents."' Joint legal custody usually accompanies
joint physical custody agreements."9
While this Note asserts that joint custody is the most favor-
able custody arrangement for the average divorced family, par-
ent-child situations may vary. What may be the perfect solution
for some, may not necessarily be the best for others. Therefore,
careful examination of the personalities and capabilities of each
person involved is imperative.
III. FATHERS AFTER DIVORCE
Although mothers still typically receive custody of the chil-
dren after divorce, custody awards to fathers are increasing. 2 '
Fathers have begun to unite in fighting for greater custody
rights, and for the privilege to maintain greater contact with
their children. 2' After a divorce, most fathers can, and should be
considered as potential custodial parents on an equal plane with
mothers, whether the custody awarded is sole or shared.
ANN. § 518.003(3)(d) (stating joint physical custody means that care, control and
residence of the child is structured between parties); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-
24(5)(c) (requiring both parents to share custody so that the child maintains fre-
quent and continuing contact with both parents); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375(1)(2)
(defining joint physical custody as awarding custody to each parent for significant
periods of time, during which the child resides with or is under care and supervision
of respective parent); Marygold S. Melli & Patricia R. Brown, The Economics of
Shared Custody: Developing an Equitable Formula for Dual Residence, 31 HOUS. L.
REV. 543, 549 (1994) (explaining that children have dual residence in true joint cus-
tody situations).
'8 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 178 (discussing possible joint custody divi-
sions). For instance, the children may spend weekdays with one parent and week-
ends with the other, three days at one home and four days at the other, or they may
spend the school year with one parent and vacations and summers with the other.
See id. But see IDAHO CODE § 32-717B(2) (stating joint physical custody is to be
shared by both parents in a way to ensure child has frequent and continuing contact
with both parents, but does not necessarily mean child's time with each should be
divided exactly equal, nor that child should be alternating back and forth between
the two). In unusual cases, it is the parents who switch residences. See WARSHAK,
supra note 1, at 178-79. Dr. Warshak warns that "[j]oint custody does not necessar-
ily mean that both parents will be equally involved in their child's upbringing." Id.
at 179.
"9 See id. at 178.
120 See infra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing increases in paternal
custody awards).
121 See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 49; Terry Arendell, Divorce, 17 Fain. Advoc.
30, 33 (1994) (discussing gender politics of divorce).
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A. Visitation and Child Custody
Non-custodial parents have a right to visitation-the right to
see their children. 122 Although custodial parents can require cer-
tain stipulations on the visitation, they cannot deny visitation
completely or arbitrarily.' Visitation agreements must be rea-
sonable and in the best interests of the children.' 24  Typically,
122 See ANDREW supra note 15, at 54. "Courts have defined visitation... as 'the
right of a parent denied custody.' " WHEELER, supra note 103, at 52. Courts have
also stated that the parental right to visitation is not absolute. See, e.g., Weaver v.
Weaver, 261 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953) (noting that the child's welfare
is paramount, and if visitation would negatively affect the child, it should be limited
or eliminated). It is usually only in extreme circumstances, however, that a court
will deny a parent's right to visitation. See WHEELER, supra, note 103, at 52. In
some cases, even a parent who is evidently "unfit" to receive custody of the children
may obtain visitation privileges. See id. Courts generally only deny visitation rights
when the parent "clearly presents a significant danger to a child's physical or emo-
tional health.. ." and even then courts first strive to permit some type of contact.
Id.; see also Weaver, 261 S.W.2d at 148 (recognizing that visitation may be limited if
there is definitive evidence that such a right may jeopardize a child). If a parent is
denied all rights to visitation, he or she is, in effect, exiled from the child. See
WHEELER, supra, note 103, at 52. As a result, courts go to extremes to protect par-
ents' visitation rights-rights that benefit both the visiting parent and the children.
See id.
Some experts, however, suggest that visitation should be granted only at the
consent of both parties, and should never be ordered if the custodial parent opposes
it. See id. at 52-53. These experts argue that if visitation is granted over the objec-
tions of the custodial parent, it will simply create unnecessary friction. See id. at 53.
Such a belief could be quite harmful. It is true that parents may argue and dislike
one another, but the children should not suffer as a result, which is what happens
when visitation is denied. This Note asserts the need for the involvement of both
parents in their children's lives, and concludes that this need can be met through
joint custody arrangements when divorce occurs.
'2 See ANDREW, supra note 15, at 55.124 See WHEELER, supra note 103, at 54 (stating non-custodial parent's role is to
have reasonable visitation with child); see also Figler v. Figler, No. FA-950374849S,
1996 WL 636479, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 1996) (holding best interests of
child would be served by reasonable visitation); Hychko v. Hychko, No. FA95-032-
04-66-S, 1995 WL 681303, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 1995) (granting liberal,
flexible, and reasonable visitation); Hankins v. Hankins, 920 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1996) (stating best interests of child is standard employed when awarding
visitation); Woodall v. Woodall, 471 S.E.2d 154, 157 (S.C. 1996) (considering welfare
and best interests of child in awarding visitation).
As with child custody, visitation decisions are made according to a judge's dis-
cretion, and should not be overturned without a showing of "an abuse of discretion."
Woodall, 471 S.E.2d at 158. A parent must establish that their visitation schedule is
"unduly restrictive" or, in the alternative, that there was an abuse of discretion by
the judge. See id. Some courts have held that they will only reverse a visitation or-
der where there is "unreasonable frequency or duration." Hankins, 920 S.W.2d at
187. The fact that a parent may be dissatisfied with the award, or finds it inconven-
ient, is not, however, sufficient grounds for reversal. See id. When awarding cus-
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visitation agreements grant the non-custodial parent visitation
rights on weekends, or on one day of the week."2 Initially, visi-
tation is a difficult situation to adjust to for all involved.
After divorce, many fathers become less involved with their
children, and often fail to exercise their right of visitation.2 One
reason is that visitation, which often involves contact between
two antagonistic parties, may create difficulties and cause fric-
tion between the parents, whose feelings can adversely affect the
children. 127  Such difficulties tend to lead to an eventual with-
drawal by the visiting parent.' Experts suggest that another
reason why visitation is not prevalent is because men, typically
the non-custodial parents, 9 are socialized without an apprecia-
tody, courts may also consider which parent they believe will be least likely to inter-
fere with a visitation order, or which will be obliging of visitation. See TERKEL, su-
pra note 14, at 57.
125 See ANDREW, supra note 15, at 55. Some custodial parents may require that
there be a written agreement defining the specified times when the non-custodial
parent may visit the children. See id. Such requests are not deemed unreasonable
by most courts. See, e.g., Hankins, 920 S.W.2d at 187; Woodall, 471 S.E.2d at 157.
126 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 76-78 (explaining why men fail to visit their
children).
117 See id at 78-80; WHEELER, supra note 103, at 54, 56. Parents tend to argue
about what they believe is proper behavior and what is not, and as a result, some
experts suggest that agreeing to reasonable visitation is not agreeing to anything.
See id. at 54.
Parents who have lost custody of their children in a custody battle may want to
strengthen their case for custody at a later date, and may, unfortunately, use their
children as a pawn, visiting them simply to achieve this goal. See id. at 55-56. The
custodial parent may then feel pressure to compete with the non-custodial parent,
and the children simply become a toy that their parents cannot share fairly. See id.
These situations are clearly not beneficial for the children, and do not foster an ap-
propriate environment. Desiring custody of one's children simply to get revenge on
one's ex-spouse is, of course, an inappropriate reason for engaging in a custody bat-
tle.
Custodial parents may want to attempt to increase their control over the chil-
dren by limiting their ex-spouse's contact with them. Non-custodial parents, on the
other hand, may try to gain their own level of control by seeking greater visitation
rights. See id. at 57. Such problems may cause children to feel caught in the middle,
and can then lead to significant difficulties in their development and well-being. See
id. at 56.
128 See WARSHAY, supra note 1, at 78-80; WHEELER, supra note 103, at 55. Dr.
Warshak notes that "[olne-third of all children who live with their single mothers
never see their fathers. One-quarter see their fathers less than once per month.
One-fifth have monthly contact. A little fewer than one-fifth see their father
weekly." WARSHAI{; supra note 1, at 76 (emphasis omitted). Approximately one out
of four children have weekly telephone conversations with their fathers. See id.
Similarly, less than one third of children with paternal visitation consider their fa-
ther's residence their own. See id.
'29 See id. at 76; WHEELER, supra note 103, at 54.
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tion for the value of strong emotional bonds with their chil-
dren."' This tendency is further reinforced by the legal system,
which grants fathers only minimal guaranteed contact with their
children.'' Eventually, the burdens accompanying such limited
visits cause many fathers to give up trying.'
This withdrawal can cause mothers, courts, and children to
mistakenly assume that non-custodial fathers decrease visitation
because "[they] don't love their children." 3 In most situations,
however, it is not the father's lack of love, but the inherent limits
of a non-custodial visiting relationship.' Specialists cite several
underlying problems with a non-custodial relationship.'35 For in-
stance, the limits placed on opportunities afforded to men to visit
with their children dictate how much time they have to spend
with their children, not a father's lack of love.'
Inherent in the non-custodial relationship are the difficulties
that arise with a change in the father's status. Typically before
a separation, there exists a conventional family structure that
facilitates a father's significant participation in his children's
lives. ' 7 After divorce, however, when this conventional frame-
work is broken and a father no longer resides with his children,
this participation is lost. 8' The father's role is diminished to
simply that of an occasional visitor of his children.'39 Profes-
sionals assert that due to this reduction of the father's role, he
has difficulty maintaining the same intensity and variety in his
relationship with his children that existed while he was living
with them.' In addition, since non-custodial fathers have only
'3' See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 76 (stating that society, has written a script
for how fathers are to behave; fathers have accepted their roles and it will take time
and adjustments to alter these).
'3' Courts are likely to grant two weekends a month or one day a week visitation
schedules. See TERKEL, supra note 14, at 60-70 (providing examples of various visi-
tation agreements).
132 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 78.
"3 Id at 77. Due to these mistaken beliefs, however, courts may subsequently
further cut-off a father's guaranteed contact, thereby creating even less incentive for
the father to visit his children. See id.
13 See id.
1 5 See id
136 See generally id. at 77-78 (postulating reasons why fathers fail to visit their
children).
7 See id. at 77.
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 See id. The intact family allows a father to participate in activities with his
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limited time with their children, they feel pressure to plan event-
filled visits to maximize their children's amusement."' Because
fathers have little time and want the time they have to be enjoy-
able, fathers no longer concern themselves with aiding their
children with their homework or enforcing their chore duties."'
As a result, these fathers become less aware of what is happen-
ing in their children's lives.' While these encounters may be
pleasant in the early stages of the non-custodial father-child re-
lationship, this "Disneyland Daddy"' phenomenon eventually
diminishes as it becomes clear that something essential is miss-
ing in the relationship, namely, a sense of normalcy and real-
ism.145 The father-child relationship is no longer as significant or
gratifying for either party as it was before the divorce. 46
In many cases, the ability to maintain a relationship with
his children is not wholly within the father's control. It is true
that non-custodial fathers, at least in theory, have control over
the relationships they form with their children, and whether
they will visit. However, it is not always their fault when they
fail to visit their children, because, in some cases, the custodial
mother may regulate the amount of visitation the father is al-
lowed.' Angry mothers may attempt to restrict the father's con-
children such as eating together daily, assisting with their homework, driving them
to after-school activities, encouraging them to perform their chores, enforcing house
rules, watching television with them, and playing with them on a daily basis. See id.
141 See id.
142 See id. At the same time, children do not want to ruin the time they have
with their fathers, and therefore they tend to mask any unhappiness. See id. Chil-
dren also tend to avoid conflicts with their fathers, for fear that they will stop visit-
ing them altogether. See id. Unfortunately, in many cases, these fears eventually
ring true. See id.
43 See id.
1" See id.; see also Goldberg, supra note 8, at 49 (discussing fathers' rights
groups' struggle against the "Disneyland Daddy" effect of the divorce process).
WAPSHAK, supra note 1, at 77 (recalling one man's comparison of the non-
custodial father's involvement with his children to that of an ice-cream man "
'coming around... and stopping to give out all sorts of delights, then disappearing
just as quickly [as he came]' "); see also Bob St. John, Starting Over and Over and
Over, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 29, 1989, at 29A (discussing the difficulties of
divorce, one father said "he felt like the proverbial ice cream man, passing the house
and handing out bars and disappearing around the corner").
140 See WARSHA; supra note 1, at 77.
147 See id. at 78-79. However, too much control by the mother may backfire.
Some states recognize a parent's interference with visitation as sufficient grounds
for ordering a modification of the custody arrangement. See Virginia A. Petersen,
Note & Comment, In re Marriage of McDole: Modifying Child Custody By Ignoring
Statutory Standards, 69 WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1994) (discussing modification
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tact with his children, either through direct legal means, or indi-
rectly through tactics such as intentionally creating scheduling
conflicts or other distractions so that the children are unable to
partake in a designated visit." 8 Such antics can create too many
hurdles for visiting fathers to maintain solid relationships with
their children.'
All in all, it is the children who are hurt by dwindling visi-
tation, either as a result of their father's own conduct, or that of
their mother. Parents must recognize that children need both
parents in their lives and need to develop significant relation-
ships with both of them. In contrast to the sole cus-
tody/visitation arrangement, joint custody would eliminate the
many problems associated with visitation because both parents
would have the opportunity to be involved to a greater extent in
their children's lives. Such arrangements afford parents the op-
portunity to form, maintain, and nourish parent-child relation-
ships on a regular basis, rather create artificial situations that
often end with the non-custodial parent abandoning his or her
relationship with the children.
B. Increasing Awards of Custody to Fathers
In today's society, a father generally desires to be an intri-
cate part of his children's lives, rather than simply a source of fi-
nancial support or a mere visitor to the children's home.' In re-
grounds of parenting plans in Washington state).
'4 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 79. Sometimes mothers will arrange for the
children to participate in an enjoyable activity during the time they were scheduled
to be with their father, thereby cutting into the father's time. See id. Some mothers
start an exciting activity just before the children are picked up by their father so as
to undermine their ex-husband's time with his children. See id.
Mothers may interfere with paternal visitation for numerous reasons. Some
may suspect abuse by the father, or unsafe conditions. Others may simply want to
"erase" the children's father from their lives in order to distance them from the di-
vorce. See id. Still other mothers are simply too angry or resentful to acknowledge
the father to their children, or they desire to punish the fathers. See id. at 80. Often
times, the hatred experienced by these mothers makes it impossible for them to
realize that their children need to have meaningful contact with their father, and
they are harming their children in the process. See id. While these reasons may
seem somewhat selfish, it should be recognized that divorce is a painful experience
that affects people in many different ways.
149 See id. at 79. Often, these fathers are susceptible to suffering "involuntary
child absence syndrome," a psychological disturbance triggered by a loss of contact
with their children. Id.
"0 Levy, supra note 64, at 5. This increasing desire to be more involved in their
children's lives has been partly attributed to the women's movement's altering of the
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sponse to these desires, recent laws and changing standards de-
mand that the gender of the parent play no part in determining
who is awarded custody of the children.'51 Furthermore, recent
cases have granted fathers sole custody.'52 In most of these
cases, however, the mother was found unfit due to mental ill-
ness, severe personality disorders, abuse or addiction.'53 It ap-
pears that the unfitness of the mother is the primary reason
courts have awarded fathers sole custody, rather than the belief
that the father can better raise the children, or that paternal
sole custody is in the children's best interests."M
Societal views about men and parenting are changing, how-
ever, and, as a result, changes in laws and theories are allowing
more fathers to gain custody of their children, even when the
mother is fit. 5' Although there has been an increase in the
consciousness of both women and men. See id. It inspired women to force their hus-
bands to play larger roles in their children's lives, so that women could leave the
home and advance their own outside pursuits. See id. Men are still trying to carry
out these parental responsibilities, yet courts and women seem to be rejecting their
efforts when it comes to post-divorce situations.
'61 As the Supreme Court of Utah so eloquently stated: "[wie believe the time
has come to discontinue our support, even in dictum, for the notion of gender-based
preferences in child custody cases." Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1986);
see also Kuutti v. Kuutti, 645 So. 2d 80, 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (stating public
policy requires there be no preferences given on the basis of gender); In re Marriage
of Dunkerson, 485 N.W.2d 483, 485 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (holding parent's gender
irrelevant in custody determinations); Ritter v. Ritter, 450 N.W.2d 204, 210 (Neb.
1990) (rejecting the notion that one parent may be presumed more fit than the other
on the basis of gender); Linda R. v. Richard E., 561 N.Y.S.2d 29, 32 (App. Div. 1990)
(mandating that gender-neutral decisions be made in custody disputes); Ruyle v.
Ruyle, 928 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding gender-neutral determi-
nations are to be made in deciding custody); Murray v. Murray, 622 P.2d 1288, 1290
n.4 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (cautioning courts not to attribute "mothering" only to
females).
152 See infra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing several law and judi-
cial decisions awarding custody on gender-neutral terms).
"3 See Haag v. Haag, 485 A.2d 1189, 1193 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (finding mother
unfit and awarding father custody); AI1igood v. Hunt, 353 S.E.2d 699, 700 (S.C.
1987) (finding mother's adulterous relationship warranted custody award to father);
Jones v. Jones, 348 S.E.2d 178, 179 (S.C. 1986) (finding mother unfit and giving cus-
tody to father).
'See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 50. Thus, although in theory courts apply gen-
der-neutral standards, "[i]n practice, this mean[s] leaving the child in the mother's
custody, absent proof of unfitness." Id.
"s See id. at 49-50. Various states have enacted laws requiring that considera-
tions made in custody decisions be gender-neutral. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-
101 (Michie 1995); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375
(West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480 (1995);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (Michie 1996). In the past few years, the fact that fa-
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amount of custody awards to fathers, the number of such awards
is still nowhere near the number granted to mothers.15 Nonethe-
less, due to the continuing shift in beliefs regarding men and
their parenting abilities, and an increase in the quantity of lit-
erature discussing men's capabilities and desires, this disparity
will presumably diminish. To effectuate a successful balance,
courts must continue to increase both the number of sole custody
awards to fathers and the amount of joint physical custody
awards. To do so will afford divorced fathers greater contact
with their children and ensure better father-child relationships.
The concept of "fathers' rights," with respect to their chil-
dren, has emerged in recent years as a result of men's increased
dissatisfaction with custody awards.'57 Although fathers' rights
advocates espouse differing approaches, there is a shared belief
in the importance of paternal involvement and in the idea that
fathers have rights with respect to their children.5 8
Some fathers' rights activists avow that fathers have histori-
cally possessed rights to their children and regularly assumed
custody of them.'59 These individuals seem to conclude that fa-
thers have just as much of a natural right to custody of their
thers have been awarded custody of their children, even when the mother is found
to be fit, suggests that some courts are beginning to believe that men are capable of
parenting. See, e.g., R.W. v. D.W.W., No. 2950648, 1997 WL 37010, at *2 (Ala. Civ.
App. Jan. 31, 1997) (stating parents on equal footing and awarding custody to fa-
ther), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ex parte D.W.W., No. 1961022, 1998 WL
81615 (Ala. Feb. 27, 1998); Kuutti, 645 So. 2d at 81 (granting father custody); Sulli-
van v. Sullivan, 668 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (awarding father cus-
tody); Vance v. Vance, 436 N.W.2d 177, 178 (Neb. 1989) (finding both parties fit, but
awarding physical custody to father); La Valley v. La Valley, 606 N.Y.S.2d 349, 350-
51 (App. Div. 1993) (finding award of custody to father better met best interests of
children, even though both parents were fit). But see Milum v. Milum, 894 S.W.2d
611, 613 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995) (denying father's request for custody); Linda R., 561
N.Y.S.2d at 34 (finding both parents fit, but granting custody to mother).
Trying to diminish the effects of gender in custody battles, courts have also
stated that the fact that a mother works outside of the home should not be a factor
used to deny her custody of her children, just as it is not a factor used to deny a fa-
ther custody. See Linda R., 561 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
1" See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 178 (stating that nine out of ten divorce
situations result in custody being awarded to the mother).
157 See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 49.
'58 See id.
... See id. at 50. Until the late 19th century, children were considered the prop-
erty of their fathers, and the rights of fathers were viewed as "natural and sacred."
Id.; see also RICHARD COLLIER, MASCULINITY, LAW AND THE FAMILY 185-89 (1995);
supra notes 40-45 (discussing children as property of father and father's entitlement
to custody).
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children as mothers, whether in the form of joint or sole cus-
tody.
160
In contrast, other groups focus their efforts upon fighting for
fathers' rights to joint custody as the best way for fathers to
maintain meaningful involvement with their children after sepa-
ration. These advocates believe that traditional and contempo-
rary gender stereotypes discriminate against men's custodial
rights.16' To counter this, they urge courts and legislatures to
recognize that men are equally as capable as women at raising
children, and that fathers should be given the opportunity to do
SO.
1 6 2
In response, legislatures and courts have partially recog-
nized these rights, and gender-neutral standards, laws, and de-
cisions have evolved, giving fathers a greater chance of obtaining
custody of their children.1" Nevertheless, society is still a long
way from fully recognizing the rights fathers have with respect
to their children, and from applying truly gender-neutral stan-
dards in a systematic fashion.
The emergence of the idea that a father has certain parental
rights has spawned a "fathers' rights movement," consisting of
various organizations advocating the rights of fathers with re-
spect to their children."6  These organizations, however, each
stress different beliefs as to the best course to follow to ensure
that fathers are awarded custody more frequently.'o Some
groups work to remedy the practice of gender discrimination in
custody disputes, arguing that while existing laws theoretically
prohibit gender discrimination, some courts still favor the
mother as the parent merely because she is a woman.6 ' Other
groups focus on promoting sole paternal custody agreements,
160 See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 50-51. With respect to the form of custody,
some proponents advocate sole paternal custody as the best way for fathers to ob-
tain their rights. See id. at 49. However, such custody is not as beneficial to the
children or the parents. See infra notes 319-350 and accompanying text (discussing
problems of sole custody and benefits ofjoint custody).161 See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 50-51.
162 See id.
1'6 See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing several laws and judi-
cial decisions awarding custody on gender-neutral terms).
64 See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 48-51. Some of these groups include "Dads
Against Discrimination," "National Organization for Fathers and Children," and
"Joint Custody Association." See id.
15 See id.
166 See id. at 49-50.
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while still others firmly believe that joint custody is the answer
to fathers' custody problems.
16 7
Some critics of these fathers' groups argue that, although
united in their goals, the divided strategies of the groups may
frustrate their purpose and cause observers to view them in a
negative light.1  Nevertheless, because they provide a united
front and can lend moral support, fathers' groups are beneficial
for men seeking greater parental rights after divorce.'69 Honest
reform will be difficult to attain, but by joining together, fathers
have a better chance to successfully lobby against well-
established feminist adversaries. 70 These "fathers' groups" are
united in the belief that the divorce process seems resolved to
make fathers into "Disneyland Daddys," and these groups strive
to overcome this unhappy and unnecessary fate.'7 '
IV. WHY FATHERS SHOULD HAVE CUSTODY
Various studies demonstrate that children do not necessarily
'67 See id. at 49, 51. Dad's Against Discrimination, which has five branches
across the country, typically advocates for sole custody because they believe there is
too much post-divorce anger experienced by the parents for joint custody to work
effectively. See id. at 49. The Joint Custody Association, however, promotes joint
custody as the most beneficial situation for fathers and their children. See id. at 51.
Other groups, like the National Organization for Fathers and Children, maintain
that the primary goal is not achieving greater rights for fathers or mothers, but
rather pursuing what is best for the children. See id. at 49.
'6 See id. Some leaders of fathers' groups are fearful about expanding their or-
ganizations throughout the country because they fear that they may not attract the
quality of people they would prefer. See id. Instead, they elect to have a localized
base and send out materials to interested parties. See id. at 51.
"9 See id. at 49.
170 See Abraham, supra note 6, at 56. Abraham, however, suggests that although
this may be an uphill battle, fathers have past and present discriminating divorce
decisions on their side. See id. He also asserts that men who divorce must fight the
biases against them individually, in addition to being members of a fathers' group.
See id. Men must fight to have as many overnight visits as possible; to have tempo-
rary custody while awaiting final custody decisions; for unrestricted, ample phone
time; and for substantial school vacation time. See id. Each time fathers fight for
custody, they must educate the leery and traditional judges that they are capable
and sincerely willing to assume the role of custodial parent. See id. In the end, such
efforts will assist all men in their future custody battles. See id.
171 See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 49. Fathers' groups provide men an opportu-
nity to discuss their pain or frustration, and the overall anger they feel towards a
system and a society that denies them access to their own children. See id. Ironi-
cally, some suggest that the "fatherless America" phenomenon has put the fathers'
movement in an extremely fortuitous position, awaking society to the realization of
fathers as bettering society as a whole, in addition to being crucial factors in their
children's lives and development. See id.
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develop better in the care of one parent over the other. Instead,
children's psychological development is comparable in both ma-
ternal-custody and paternal-custody homes.'72 One study that
examined approximately thirteen "reactions, attitudes, traits,
and behavior[s]," reported that there were no "overall differences
that favored father-custody or mother-custody homes."' These
findings led to the conclusion that there are no discernible rea-
sons for discriminating against fathers in custody decisions;
there is no justification for concluding that maternal custody is
superior to paternal custody. Research suggests that children
in paternal-custody homes are not disadvantaged when com-
pared with children in maternal-custody homes. 5 Divorce elicits
the same types of behavior and feelings in children whether their
father or mother obtains custody;76 children are hurt and de-
pressed after divorce, regardless of with whom they ultimately
reside. 7
172 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 133.
173 Id. at 134. These include:
"1. Sadness.
2. Distress.
3. Longing for the intact family.







11. Custodial parent-child relationships.
12. Teacher-child relationships.
13. Peer relationships." Id.
174 See id. at 134. (citing studies assessing the psychological development of
children of divorced families, the author called "striking" the similarities "between
father-custody and mother-custody families").
176 See id.; see also Levy, supra note 64, at 7 ("'[C]hildren raised by men can be
vigorous, competent and thriving infants who may be especially comfortable with
[others and have] interest[s] in stimulation from the external environment.' ")
(quoting Kyle D. Pruett, Infants of Primary Nurturing Fathers, 38 PSYCHOANALYTIC
STUDY CHILD 257 (1983).
176 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 129. Regardless of whether children reside
with their mothers or fathers, typical responses to divorce include "anger, confusion,
worrg, and grief." Id.
See id. ("[Dlivorce is a major stressful life event for most children... [and]
these reactions are no worse in father-custody homes than in mother-custody
homes.").
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A. Gender Role Stereotypes
While there are studies revealing no substantial difference
in a child's development based on the gender of the parent
granted custody, some advocate that the primary reason why fa-
thers should obtain equal custodial rights is because men and
women contribute different attributes to children's development,
and children develop differently under the care of men and
women."' Research is varied and controversial regarding the
contributions of men and women in children's development. 179
Some researchers contend that fathers play an important role in
their children's mental and moral development.18 ° These special-
ists suggest that infant boys benefit intellectually if their fathers
are good playmates, keep them interested in various games, and
provide stimulating play, and that fathers enhance infant girls'
mental development if they provide verbal stimulation.181 Stud-
ies also show that a strong paternal presence assists children in
reaching their intellectual potential.18 2  Research further inti-
mates that fathers play an important part in assisting their chil-
dren in their transition from the security of the family home to
life as an adult.183 Finally, studies reveal that children who
spend more time with their fathers are more empathetic towards
178 See generally id. at 35-50. Carol Gilligan also suggests that men and women
develop differently as a result of their gender and upbringing, especially in the area
of morality. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 25-29 (1982). Studies suggest that male children ap-
proach moral dilemmas "impersonally through... logic" while female children seek
resolution "through communication in relationship." Id. at 29.
179 See Levy, supra note 64, at 6 (stating evidence of parental influence regard-
ing "achievement and intellectual development is inconclusive"); compare Judy Au-
erbach et al., Commentary, On Gilligan's In a Different Voice, 11 FEMINIST STUDIES
149, 155 (1985) (criticizing Carol Gilligan's conclusions regarding men and women
and moral development) with WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 35-50 (discussing various
developmental processes that fathers affect). Some critics argue that other factors,
such as class, race, religion, and ethnicity may be more important than gender. See
Auerbach, supra, at 155.
'"0 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 39, 45. However, paternal influence in these
areas can be both advantageous and disadvantageous. See id. at 39.
181 See id. at 40.
"2 See id. at 41-42 (noting that although the father may be successful, it is his
availability and support that positively impacts his children's intellectual develop-
ment). Warshak also cites successful women, such as Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher and Indira Gandhi, who credit their fathers as their inspiration. See id.
"3 See id. at 42. Children who had more contact with their fathers are more so-
ciable, assertive and active. See id. at 42-43.
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others."
Researchers have also identified differences in the way
mothers and fathers approach their role as caretakers. Mothers
tend to be more involved in the everyday care-taking responsi-
bilities, and, as a result, do not engage in the stimulating contact
and physical play attributed to fathers." Fathers, typically
more involved with their sons than their daughters,"' demand a
great deal of sex role conformity.87 Fathers substantially influ-
ence their offspring by encouraging masculine behavior in their
sons and feminine behavior in their daughters. s In two-parent
homes, children benefit from exposure to the functional diversity
of each parent.'89 However, custody determinations are influ-
enced by stereotypes that portray women as the omnipotent par-
ent, capable of tending to all of their children's needs,'"0 and fa-
thers as peripheral caretakers. 9'
Other researchers discount findings regarding the differ-
ences between male and female influences upon children. In-
stead, they espouse that gender has little effect upon children's
'84 See id. at 46. Possible reasons for this include: (1) fathers will have more
time to model empathy for their children; (2) those children may already be more
empathetic; and (3) these families may be more harmonious, thus developing empa-
thy. See id.
18 See Levy, supra note 64, at 5.
'88 See id. at 6.
'8 See id. "[Tiheorists propose that fathers have a major impact on sex role de-
velopment through modeling and identification." Id. at 5.
See id. at 6.
S' ee id. at 5.
1 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 30-31. Acknowledging the traditional defer-
ence to maternal custody, a 1921 decision stated:
[Tihat constant ministration required during the period of nurture that
only a mother can give because in her alone is duty swallowed up in desire;
in her alone is service expressed in terms of love. She alone has the pa-
tience and sympathy required to mold and soothe the infant mind in its
adjustment to its environment. The difference between fatherhood and
motherhood in this respect is fundamental....
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 181 N.W. 826,827 (Wis. 1921).
191 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 31 (noting the traditional designation of the
father as family "breadwinner"). Conversely, women have been subjected to em-
ployment discrimination due to unfavorable stereotypes categorizing them as
"incompetent, weak, dependent, passive, uncompetitive and unconfident." Brief for
Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of Respondent at 13,
Price Waterhose v. Hopkins, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No. 87-1167) available
in LEXIS, Genfed Library, US Plus File [hereinafter APA Brief].
'9See Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological Par-
ent Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 347, 356-57 (1996) (discussing studies
that conclude mothers and fathers are equally competent to care for children).
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overall development. 9 ' Gender role stereotypes should not be
relied upon to pronounce the appropriate form of custody.
Stereotypes create certain expectations about specific classes of
people, and these expectations can lead to mistaken judgments
regarding behavior.' These mistaken beliefs typically place
people at a disadvantage in spite of their individual capabilities
or accomplishments. 95 For example, fathers traditionally have
been discriminated against in custody disputes as a result of
stereotypical beliefs regarding their parenting skills.'96 There-
fore, research discussing the unique benefits fathers bestow
upon their children is insufficient to foster the support needed by
fathers anxious to obtain custody and rear their children.
Rather, this research merely reinforces stereotypes of mothers as
nurturers and fathers as providers, regardless of some fathers'
competence or potential to excel at parenting.' 97 Children need
contact with both of their parents after a divorce simply so that
they may reap the benefits of having two people to love and care
for them, not because research suggests that men and women
provide different developmental contributions.
B. Other Factors
Despite the fact that research shows maternal and paternal
custody homes are comparable, and that neither is more advan-
tageous than the other, various problems exist in sole custody
environments. In Beck v. Beck,'98 the New Jersey Supreme Court
denounced sole custody as isolating children from their non-
custodial parent and creating great economic and emotional bur-
dens for the sole custodial parent.'99 The court further stated
that children's best interests are not properly served by many
"3 See Linda K. Kerber et al., On In a Different Voice: An Interdisciplinary Fo-
rum, 11 SIGNS 304, 312 (1986) (critiquing Gilligan's analysis that boys and girls de-
velop differently).
94 See APA Brief, supra note 191, at 13 (discussing the impact of stereotypes on
gender-based employment discrimination).
"' See id.
" See supra notes 47-63 and accompanying text (discussing the tender years
doctrine); see also supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text (discussing the primary
caretaker doctrine and its effect on gender stereotyping).
197 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 102-03 (noting that although men may have
difficulty communicating their feelings, they are still able to acquire nurturing skills
in order to respond to their children's emotional needs).
'98 432 A.2d 63 (N.J. 1981).
'9 Id. at 65.
[Vol. 72:517
19981 GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN JOINT CUSTODY 555
aspects of the sole custody arrangement . 0
Since sole custody homes are typically headed by mothers,
the problems associated with sole custody are frequently imbued
on women. As previously noted, however, such problems are
equally present in single-family homes headed by either gen-
der."0' Children living with only one of their parents often suffer
from various psychological difficulties including, "insecure gen-
der identity, impaired capacity for intimate relationships, de-
pression, anxiety, poor self-control and.., low self-esteem."
2 2
Children's self-esteem thrives when their parents bestow
"warmth, understanding, and positive attention" upon them.0 3
These are assets in high demand and low supply after a divorce,
when many parents, preoccupied with their own troubles, have
difficulty responding to their children's potentially increased
needs.2 °  Mothers tend to withdraw from their children when
feeling depressed.25 This isolation can cause increased pain for
children in mother-custody homes, who may have limited contact
with their fathers.*2s Children benefit from greater contact,
warmth, and love when there are two parents available. Joint
custody provides such benefits.
Children in sole custody homes have difficulty developing
and maintaining intimate relationships with others.0 7 In addi-
tion, children reared in divorced homes suffer from depression
and anxiety about the loss they have endured . 0  Such children
tend to fear that they will continue to lose things that are impor-
200 See id.
201 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 128-29, 133, 135 (finding no difference in
traits such as maturity, independence, and behavior existed between children living
with their mothers or their fathers).
202 Id. at 55; see also WARE, supra note 103, at 12 (noting diminished self-esteem
in children results when non-custodial parent fails to visit).
203 WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 56.
214 See id. Divorced parents are typically absorbed in their own problems and
emotions and have, for at least some time, difficulty responding to the needs of their
children. See id. Divorced mothers are more likely to nag, discipline, and criticize
their children than divorced fathers. See id. The more saddened a mother becomes,
the less time she has for her children and the children's sense of themselves de-
creases. See id. Children may also develop low self-esteem because they are
ashamed that their parents divorced in the first place, or because of the way they
are treated by a non-custodial parent. See id. at 57.
205 See id.
206 See id.
207 See id. at 59-64.
200 See Samuel Roll, How a Child Views the Move, The Psychology of Attachment,
Separation, and Loss, 20 FAM. ADvoc. 26, 28-29 (Fall 1997).
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tant to them.0 9 Maintaining substantial, meaningful relation-
ships with both parents may help to assuage those feelings.
Parents involved in sole custody arrangements also experi-
ence a variety of difficulties. Visitation problems typically arise,
and, as previously noted, may eventually lead to infrequent con-
tact between the non-custodial parent and the children.210 Sole
custodial parents experience greater levels of stress because they
are forced to perform dual roles and take on a greater amount of
responsibility.21   Parental responsibilities associated with sole
custody can overwhelm and severely inhibit the sole custodial
parent's ability to raise the children effectively by increasing his
or her stress levels.212 These parents must simultaneously bal-
ance their own lives, their children's well-being, and their ca-
reers, all alone.213 In sum, sole custody often deprives a custodial
parent of cooperative support in raising children. Parents occa-
sionally need a break from the pressures of child rearing, and in
sole custody homes, such breaks are infrequent.1 4 Finally, sole
custody can place large financial burdens on the custodial par-
ent.215  Child-rearing responsibilities are more effectively bal-
anced in joint custody arrangements, relieving any one parent
from being or feeling overburdened.216
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 1 7 and a Michigan
209 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 66-70. "Once a parent leaves the home...
many children never regain the sense of security they felt before the divorce. If you
can't count on your parents-your bedrock of security-you can't count on anything.
Life is no longer so safe, so predictable, so secure." Id. at 68. Children may believe
that they can test their independence, either at home or at school, when their fa-
thers are not in the home. See id. at 70. This tendency to act out has been attributed
to cultural conditioning that reinforces the role of the father as the family's author-
ity figure. See id. Particularly when fathers leave the family home, "children feel a
weakening of the power structure." Id.
210 See supra notes 122-149 and accompanying text (discussing visitation).
211 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 183, 184. These parents suffer from what can
be termed "task overload," and have difficulty balancing different aspects of their
lives such as children, housework, their careers, and social lives. See id. at 95. These
overwhelming responsibilities can create tremendous stress, leaving the parent with
no buffer between their children and themselves. See id.
212 See id. at 183.
213 See id. at 95, 183.
214 See id.
215 See Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 65 (N.J. 1981); Melli & Brown, supra note 117,
at 549-50.
216 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 184.
217 UNIF. MARR. AND DIVORCE ACT, § 402, 9A U.L.A. 348 (1987).
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statute 21 promulgate several ways to sharpen the focus of the
equivocal "best interests of the child" standard. They set forth
various criteria for courts to examine in determining a child's
best interests. 219 However, they both imply that only one parent
can better fulfill each criterion, and further suggest that a judge
determine the better parent in each category and then tally up
who has the most "points." Why, however, has the best interests
of the child test come to mean the best one of the child's two par-
ents, if both are qualified? It would be best for children to have
218 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (West 1997) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.612(3)
(Callaghan Supp. 1997)).
219 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act requires the court to examine:
... all relevant factors including
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his... parents,
his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's
best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental health and physical health of all individuals involved.
UNIF. MARR. AND DIVORCE ACT, § 402, 9A U.L.A. 348 (1987).
The Michigan statute is similar, but has a sharper focus on psychological con-
siderations:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the par-
ties involved and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child
love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of
the child in his or her religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child
with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and
permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other
material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environ-
ment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home or homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to
be of sufficient age to express preference.
(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and en-
courage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child
and the other parent or the child and the parents.
(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed
against or witnessed by the child.
(1) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular
child custody dispute.
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.23.
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two qualified parents working for their best interests rather
than requiring that a court select only one.
The specific factors set forth in the Michigan statute,
namely, "[tihe capacity.., of the parties... to give the child
love, affection and guidance... ; 0 and "[t]he capacity.., of the
parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical
care... and other material needs," 1 are provisions that should
be received from b6th parents, and are qualities that two parents
can provide, simultaneously. In fact, children would fare better
having two people performing these tasks rather than just one.2 2
Theoretically, both parents performed these tasks before divorce,
which supports the proposition that they need not be mutually
exclusive after divorce. It is the parents' relationship with each
other that changes through divorce-their relationship with
their children should not.
It is senseless that after subjecting children to a traumatic
divorce,' our society and court system presume that they need
only one parent's care, while prior to this painful experience they
needed two. Joint custody eliminates the requirement of a com-
parison of children's parents after divorce, as these Acts incor-
rectly propose.' Under joint custody, a presumption arises that
both parents are capable of meeting their children's best inter-
ests, and affords them the opportunity to do so. The children are
also granted an opportunity to grow in an environment where all
those desiring to care for and provide the best for them may do
so, unhampered.2
Both fathers and mothers are important in child develop-
ment. Their importance, however, is not solely a reflection of
gender roles. Men and women are both capable of rearing chil-
dren and meeting their needs. While evidence regarding the ef-
fects of gender roles on children's development is inconclusive,226
it remains unquestioned that ideally, children should be afforded
the opportunity to mature under the care and supervision of both
220 Id. § 722.23(b).
221 Id. § 722.23(c).
222 See Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 66 (N.J. 1981).
223 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 129.
24 See Levy, supra note 64, at 7.
25 See Beck, 432 A.2d at 66.
226 See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing inconclusive evidence
on the effects of gender roles on children's development).
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parents. 227 Research has also concluded that men are as capable
as women of rearing children, and that children do not develop
more positively or negatively under the sole custody of one as
opposed to the other.' Men should, therefore, more frequently
be awarded joint custody of their children after divorce. Provid-
ing children greater contact with both parents and giving di-
vorced fathers a greater opportunity to parent, thereby sharing
the responsibilities and the rewards of parenthood, are innate
benefits of the joint custody arrangement.
V. JOINT CUSTODY
Historically, child custody has been defined by society as
only one parent having custody of the children. 9 The increased
divorce rate, however, has caused people to begin recognizing the
inherent problems attributable to sole custody, and to develop a
solution-joint custody.20 Just twenty years ago, this custody
option was unavailable to divorcing couples. 1 However, joint
custody has become increasingly prevalent throughout the coun-
try; all states, except South Carolina, presently acknowledge it
as a viable option. 2
A. Joint Custody Laws
A presumption for joint custody exists in a minority of
27 See Martha Minnow, Whatever Happened to Children's Rights, 80 MINN. L.
REV. 267, 282 (1995) (stating children need care from both parents).
228 See WARSHAK4 supra note 1, at 129-30.
229 See id. at 177.
230 See id. Some of the problems associated with sole custody include over-
whelmed custodial parents who may adversely affect their children's well-being, an-
gry non-custodial parents who distance themselves from their children, and de-
pressed children who yearn for more meaningful relationships with the non-
custodial parent. See id.
23' See Melli & Brown, supra note 117, at 548. Courts were required to award
custody to only one parent upon divorce. See id. Prior to 1975, North Carolina was
the only state with a statute authorizing joint custody. See HERBERT JACOB, SILENT
REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 135
(1988). North Carolina's law, however, mainly addressed abuse and neglect situa-
tions. See id.
See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 49, 51; see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101
(1996) (stating that courts may award joint custody and have great discretion in
doing so); Kyle Romminger, Divorce 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 262, 266 (1996)
(acknowledging that courts are recognizing joint custody more frequently); see also
WARS-AK, supra note 1, at 177 (noting that while it seems that joint custody is
"sweeping the nation," the proportion of children living with their mothers after di-
vorce is still nine out often).
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states, and is established by statute, case law, or habitual use.
This presumption exists for several reasons, but primarily, be-
cause states have declared, through public policy mandates, that
children be afforded the opportunity to have meaningful contact
with both parents.2 These states maintain that the joint cus-
tody presumption enables courts to make better custody ar-
rangements for both parents and children. 5 It forces decision-
makers to first look at joint custody arrangements as a possibil-
See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 49, 50. These include: California, Connecticut,
Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas. See
id. It should be noted that Goldberg's use of the term joint custody means either
joint physical or legal custody, either jointly or severally. See also CAL. FAM. CODE §
3040 (West 1996) (mandating awards to both parents is first in order of preference
for custody decisions); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (stating that there is a presumption
that joint custody is in best interest of child); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56a (1995 &
Supp. 1997) (same); IDAHO CODE § 32-717B (1996) (same); IOWA CODE § 598.41
(1995) (dictating that a court denying joint custody must cite clear and convincing
evidence why); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335 (West 1996) (requiring courts to render
joint custody resolutions unless good cause shown); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24
(1996) (placing joint custody, both physical and legal, as first preference); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 452.375 (West 1996) (requiring court to first consider joint custody); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 40-4-222 (1995) (stating public policy of Montana that children main-
tain relationships with both parents), 40-4-223 (joint custody is first on list of con-
siderations); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 125.480 (1995) (joint custody is first preference to
be considered), 125.490 (stating that there is a presumption that joint custody is in
the best interests of child); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 (1995) (same); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (Michie 1996) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 109 (West
1996) (parents may request joint custody and joint custody is in best interests of
child); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101 (1996) (presumption that joint custody is in best
interests of child); Hamlet v. Hamlet, 583 So. 2d 654, 656 (Fla. 1991) (granting joint
custody); In re Marriage of Dunkerson, 485 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992)
(finding joint legal custody should be awarded unless unreasonable); In re Marriage
of Bradley, 899 P.2d 471, 475 (Kan. 1995) (finding joint custody is in best interests of
child); Matthews v. Matthews, 633 So. 2d 342, 347 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (holding pre-
sumption of joint custody can only be rebutted by sufficient evidence); Rosenfeld v.
Rosenfeld, 529 N.W.2d 724, 725 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding joint legal custody is
presumed in best interests of child); Morton v. Stockdale, 888 S.W.2d 362, 368 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1994) (awarding joint custody); Meigs v. Meigs, 920 P.2d 1077, 1078 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1996) (permitting courts to award joint custody); In re S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d
80, 88 (Tex. 1992) (affirming joint custody). But see In re Marriage of Levsen, 510
N.W.2d 892, 894 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (disfavoring shared physical custody, except
in unusual circumstances); Hankins v. Hankins, 920 S.W.2d 182, 186-87 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996) (finding option of joint custody, not presumption); Woodall v. Woodall,
471 S.E.2d 154, 158 (S.C. 1996) (stating presumption ofjoint custody is harmful).
2 See Ponnambalam, supra note 106, at 33 (finding children benefit from nur-
turing of both parents and New York's public policy favors maintaining contact with
both parents); Van Deusen, supra note 44, at 421 (stating California public policy
favors contact with both parents).
2" See Ponnambalam, supra note 106, at 33.
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ity, before examining whether there are grounds for denying
joint custody.16 The presumption assumes that joint custody is
in the best interests of the children. 7 However, recognizing the
fact that every family situation is unique, all joint custody ar-
rangements will not be identical, and the joint custody pre-
sumption does not pigeon hole all divorced families."a The pre-
sumption of joint custody is also beneficial in encouraging the
courts and the public to recognize the importance of both parents
in children's lives. 9
There are critics of the joint custody presumption, however,
who argue that it continues to place fathers at a disadvantage.
Such critics assert that the animosity between the parents does
not cease upon completion of the divorce, and that these feelings
are perpetuated by the joint custody arrangement, creating even
further hardships for the children.' ° These critics assert that if
a father believes that seeking joint custody of his children will
require continued contact with his ex-spouse, he will be less in-
clined to pursue this form of custody."' Furthermore, some ar-
gue that requiring parents to participate in joint custody ar-
rangements will only serve to aggravate existing disputes and
difficulties, which may have led the parents to divorce in the
26 See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3040 (West 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (1996);
M O. ANN. STAT. § 452.375 (West 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 125.480 (1995).
47 See supra note 233 and accompanying text (presenting various state laws
finding joint custody to be in best interests of child).
28 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 202. All parents and families function differ-
ently and will continue to do so after a joint custody arrangement is awarded. See
id. In fact, joint custody may allow for greater diversity than a sole custody ar-
rangement, because the children's activities, which each parent has freedom to
permit, can vary greatly depending upon which parent they are with at a given
time. See id-
239 See id. at 201. Cultural expectations dictate the way in which individuals
think and act. See id. The cultural presumption that sole maternal custody is the
best solution to custody disputes has led to nearly ninety percent of all custody bat-
tles ending with the mother retaining sole physical custody of her children. See id.
Society frowns upon women who relinquish custody of their children, due to the pre-
sumption that their rightful place is with their children. See id. A joint custody pre-
sumption might change what society views as the norm in child custody, and could
give fathers a better chance of maintaining contact with their children after divorce.
See id.
240 See Goldberg supra note 8, at 49.
241 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 202. This could be viewed as a benefit of a
joint custody presumption, however, because painful custody litigation may de-
crease, thus preventing unnecessary exposure of parents and children to further
psychological harm. See id. at 202-03.
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first place.2" This is particularly true where the parents origi-
nally sought sole custody.US
Nevertheless, judges are typically capable of determining
whether joint custody is appropriate in a particular circum-
stance. Even in jurisdictions with a joint custody presumption,
courts normally have discretion to deny joint custody, if neces-
sary.' Courts may consider the parents' animosity or reluctance
as factors in their decision-making process.2" Furthermore, even
if a statute provides for joint custody, courts may refuse such an
award if it is not in the children's best interests.2"
B. Considerations for Awarding Joint Custody
Although increasing in frequency, joint custody is still not
the norm in custody awards. 7 Courts award joint custody for
virtually the same reasons as for creating a presumption of joint
custody-namely that children need to maintain contact with
both parents as part of their healthy development.248 Courts
have enumerated various factors that they consider important in
deciding whether to grant joint custody, the most important be-
ing the children's best interests. 9 Another important factor is
the ability of the parents to cooperate and act amiably toward
242 See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 51 (questioning whether a presumption ofjoint
custody "motivate[s] parents to mend their fences more quickly, or... aggravate[s]
the conflict by throwing them together when they would rather be apart").
243 See id.
24 See, e.g., Darnall v. Darnall, 657 So.2d 387, 389 (La. Ct App. 1995) (rejecting
the statutory presumption as not in the child's best interest); Bergeron v. Bergeron,
492 So. 2d 1193 (La. 1986) (finding that joint custody would be deleterious to the
child).
245 See infra notes 278-79 and accompanying text (discussing parental conflict).
240 See Darnall, 657 So.2d at 389 (refusing to grant joint custody because it
would create greater tension in the child's life).
247 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 177. Though joint custody awards are increas-
ing in number, mothers still retain physical custody in nine out of ten cases, as a
result of the bifurcated meaning of the term "joint custody." Typically, joint legal
custody is awarded, not joint physical custody, and women receive physical custody
more frequently. See id. at 177-78; Melli & Brown, supra note 117, at 551 (discuss-
ing statistics concerning joint physical and legal custody); supra note 75 and accom-
panying text (citing that statistically women receive joint and legal custody with
more success than men).
248 See Van Deusen, supra note 44, at 424 (stating parents should share the
rights and responsibilities of child-rearing after divorce or separation). For more in-
depth analysis of the reasons why men are needed in children's lives and for their
development, see WARSHA, supra note 1, at 55-71 and supra notes 180-184 and ac-
companying text (discussing benefits fathers have in children's lives).
4 See Goldberg supra note 8, at 51.
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one another.'0
It is imperative that children's parents are able to cooperate
in a joint custody arrangement because they will have more con-
tact with each other than under sole custody. Without this coop-
eration, a joint custody arrangement will not be in the children's
best interests.2' Existing problems may be overcome, however,
through agreements minimizing the parents contact with one
another.12 Since the children benefit tremendously in joint cus-
tody situations, some parents may try to put aside their own
grievances and differences for their children's sakes. Some ex-
perts advocate that when both parents "bonded with their chil-
dren" before a divorce, and formed relationships that they
wished to maintain after a divorce, they will be less likely to be
willing to settle for one day a week visits. 3 To continue these
parent-child relationships, the ex-spouses may be willing to
maintain a more amiable relationship with each other.2 Ex-
perts also suggest that children understand their parents' efforts
and desires to have contact with them, causing the children to
feel secure in their relationships with both parents. 5 For joint
custody to be successful, parents must agree that they will com-
municate with one another regarding their children's best inter-
2 See Figler v. Figler, No. FA-950374849S, 1996 WL 636479, at *2, *6 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 1996) (awarding mother sole custody as parties were uncoopera-
tive); Wellman v. Wellman, 512 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (noting ample
evidence existed to reject joint custody); Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 529 N.W.2d 724,
726 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding joint custody should only be granted when par-
ents can cooperate with one another); Leone v. Leone, 917 S.W.2d 608, 614 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996) (stating an important factor to consider is parties' ability to cooperate
and function as a parental unit); Alt v. Alt, 896 S.W.2d 519, 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
(finding communication problems not severe enough to deny joint custody); Burk-
hart v. Burkhart, 876 S.W.2d 675, 680 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that where rec-
ord is lacking any evidence that parties have commonality of ideas about child-
rearing, joint custody is inappropriate); Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55-56 (Wyo.
1995) (reversing joint custody order due to parents' inability to cooperate).
u' See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 192-93. Often, the parents' relationship may
improve as a result of the joint custody arrangement. See id.
252 For example, the father may have custody for one month and the mother for
another. The parents may agree to simply drop the children off at the other parent's
house. See id. (discussing parental conflict).
m See Rozanne Friedman, Joint Physical Custody Really Can Work, 73 MICH.
B.J. 650, 650 (1994) (stating that joint custody has had a positive effect on children
because they can recognize and feel the warmth of both parents).
21 See id. (concluding that such parental relationships are in the best interests
of children).
25 See id. (discussing various ways parents could establish channels of commu-
nication).
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ests and welfare.us
In addition, courts examine various logistical factors when
deciding whether to award joint custody. For example, some-
times joint custody is difficult during the school year if the par-
ents live far away from each other.27 In such situations, the
children may not be able to attend the same school during the
year which may cause academic difficulties, thus, warranting a
denial of joint custody."s However, this situation could be re-
solved by creating a custody arrangement under which the chil-
dren reside with one parent during the school year, and with the
other during vacations.
Relocation of the parents, or a custodial parent's desire to
move or change residences, is another factor courts consider. 9
Most states require that parents in sole custody arrangements
who wish to change the residences of the children must obtain
either the consent of the non-custodial parent or judicial per-
210mission. Parents must then demonstrate, among other things,
2 See id. Some believe that attorneys should instruct and advise clients on the
manner in which they communicate with their ex-spouses, and its importance if
they desire joint custody. See id. Other experts believe that joint custody is inappro-
priate unless the parents request it, due to the need for "voluntary and mutual co-
operation" by both to ensure success. See id.; Sam Margulies, Sole, Joint (and Less)
Custody, 13 NO. 12 Fair$hare 16 (1993) (asserting that courts can, and many times
do, amend and approve joint custody agreements that have already been decided
upon between parents).
27 See TERKEL, supra note 14, at 21-22. One such instance is where the parents
reside in different states. In such situations, parents may decide that there can still
be a joint custody arrangement, but one parent would have the children during the
school year and the other during the summer and vacations, or some similar varia-
tion. See id. Regardless, if they have joint legal custody they are still both making
decisions regarding the children's welfare, no matter where they live. See id.
2m See id. at 21. In rare cases, the courts will grant a joint custody arrangement
anyway and the children may attend two different schools, or commute to one, or
the other. See id.; see also WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 203-04 (commenting on the
failure of joint custody when the parents live far apart). A parent's work schedule
may also pose a problem, preventing them from participating in a joint custody ar-
rangement. See id. at 202. If a particular state had a presumption favoring joint
custody, couples and families with such logistical problems would be considered de-
partures from the norm, and a judge would decide that joint custody was not bene-
ficial for the parties involved, especially the children. See id.
See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 476 (Cal. 1996) (discussing relo-
cation of custodial parents in sole custody arrangements); Cook v. Cook, 898 P.2d
702, 705 (Nev. 1995) (same); Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 904 (N.D. 1997) (same).
260 See Cook, 898 P.2d at 705; Stout, 560 N.W.2d at 904; Merril Sobie, Whatever
Happened to the "Best Interests" Analysis in New York Relocation Cases? A Re-
sponse, 15 PACE L. REV. 685, 685-86 (1995) (discussing requirements for relocation
of custodial parent and children).
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that the relocation is in the children's best interest.26' Several
states also require that these steps be followed when a joint cus-
todial parent seeks to relocate.262 If a change in location is
granted, there may be a need for a joint custody modification,
but hopefully, it will be limited to when and how often the chil-
dren will switch homes. Under these circumstances, it may be
that more extended stays with each parent, or custody splits
based on the school year, would be appropriate."
Sometimes, the children cannot adjust and have difficulty
alternating residences on a regular basis, as provided by the
joint custody arrangement. 2 4 This may present cause for a judge
261 See Cook, 898 P.2d at 705 (discussing best interests of child and relocation);
Stout, 560 N.W.2d at 904; Sobie, supra note 260, at 687-88 (addressing relocation
and best interests of child). But see In re Burgess, 913 P.2d at 482-83 (holding parent
seeking to relocate bears no burden of establishing that it is necessary to do so).
The court in Cook set forth various factors that courts should examine when deter-
mining whether a parent should be permitted to relocate. Some of these include:
(1) the extent to which the move is likely to improve the quality of life for
both the children and the custodial parent; (2) whether the custodial par-
ent's motives are honorable, and not designed to frustrate or defeat the
noncustodial parent's visitation rights; (3) whether, if permission to remove
is granted, the custodial parent will comply with revised visitation orders
issued by the court; (4) whether the noncustodial parent's motives are hon-
orable in resisting permission to remove, or to what extent, if any, the op-
position is intended to secure a financial advantage regarding ongoing sup-
port obligations or otherwise; and (5) whether removal will provide
realistic opportunities for the noncustodial parent to have visitation rights
that will adequately foster and preserve the noncustodial parent's relation-
ship with the children.
Cook, 898 P.2d at 705 (citing Schwartz v. Schwartz, 812 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Nev.
1991)).
2612 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125A.350 (1997). The Nevada statute
states, in pertinent part:
If custody has been established and the custodial parent or a parent having
joint custody intends to move his residence to a place outside of [the] state
and to take the child with him, he must, as soon as possible and before the
planned move, attempt to obtain written consent of the other parent to
move the child from the state. If the noncustodial parent or other parent
having joint custody refuses to give that consent, the parent planning the
move shall, before he leaves the state with the child, petition the court for
permission to move the child.
Id.
261 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 192-96. Courts are also beginning to grapple
with the issue of whether these requirements infringe upon the custodial parent's
right to travel. See generally Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A
Constitutional Perspective, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1 (1995-96) (discussing the
constitutional implications of a custodial parent's decision to relocate to another
state).
264 See WARSHAX supra note 1, at 194-95.
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to adjust the custody arrangement, but hopefully, only by modi-
fying the joint custody, rather than merely awarding one parent
sole custody. Of course, a judge can and should use discretion in
examining the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a joint custody arrangement is appropriate.
VI. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF JOINT CUSTODY
A. Benefits and Detriments of Joint Custody: Generally
Presently, a heated debate regarding the best type of cus-
tody arrangement exists.26 As with any debate, there are posi-
tives and negatives on both sides. One of the benefits of joint le-
gal custody is that each parent has the opportunity to be
involved in a meaningful manner in their children's lives and
welfare.26  Non-custodial parents receive more rights and
authority under a joint legal custody regime, which causes them
to feel more worthwhile in their children's lives.267 Joint legal
custody may also alleviate the frustration a non-custodial parent
experiences when he or she is denied the ability to parent a de-
nial which is often unwarranted because, as has been shown,
both parents play a significant role in their children's lives and
healthy development. 268 Furthermore, children reap the benefits
of having two people overseeing their best interests, typically
leading to better results.269 Finally, both parents will likely be
more committed to their children, emotionally and financially.27 °
As mentioned above, however, some argue that joint legal
custody permits parents to continue arguing, which negatively
impacts the children who are subjected to, and often the subject
of, those arguments.27' Still others contend, joint custody affords
an unreasonable parent too much authority, and the opportunity
'0 See id. at 177-205 (examining the advantages and disadvantages of joint cus-
tody arrangements from different perspectives).
r See TERKEL, supra note 14, at 23; WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 178 (discussing
different custody arrangements).
2"7 See TERKEL, supra note 14, at 23.
268 See id. at 22.
29 See WARSHAY, supra note 1, at 196-98.
270 See Kearney, supra note 41, at 555-56.
271 See TERKEL, supra note 14, at 23; Goldberg, supra note 8, at 51. These chil-
dren feel guilty and hurt by their parents' actions and words and this may add diffi-
culties to an already trying situation. See WARSHAY, supra note 1, at 202-03. Chil-
dren may also feel as if they are stuck between their parents and their problems.
See Kearney, supra note 41, at 556.
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to regulate the children and the other parent.272
Joint physical custody can raise these same issues, as well
as additional problems, unique to physical custody.273 However,
joint physical custody can be more beneficial than joint legal cus-
tody, particularly for the parent who would be the non-custodial
parent if the alternative was sole custody.74 In joint physical
custody, both parents have custody and feel as significant in the
children's lives as the other because there is presumably no
grave disparity between them regarding their authority.27 Also,
parents can evenly share the parental rights and more signifi-
cantly, the responsibilities.27 Therefore, such arrangements af-
ford parents the opportunity to avoid the frustration and stress
caused when one parent is overwhelmed performing the job for-
merly done by two.277
The problem of parental conflict remains and could be accen-
tuated by joint physical custody, especially if the parents have
frequent contact with one another.27 Nevertheless, with joint
custody, neither party has an upper-hand, unlike sole custody
arrangements, where the non-custodial parent is often forced to
be deferential to the custodial parent, possibly in an attempt to
minimize antagonism.
279
272 See TERKEL, supra note 14, at 23 (discussing some of the difficulties that may
arise with joint legal custody).
273 See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text (discussing logistical difficul-
ties of physical custody).
274 See TERKEL, supra note 14, at 22.
275 See id.
271 See Kearney, supra note 41, at 560. Parents demand equal power to make
decisions regarding the manner in which their children are raised, as well as the
opportunity to see their children. See id.
27 See WARSHAX, supra note 1, at 95 (noting that such significant amounts of
work can be oppressive for a parent starting a new single life, trying to balance a
job, housework, and child care all alone).
278 See Carol S. Bruch and Janet M. Bowermasker, The Relocation of Children
and Custodial Parents: Public Policy, Past and Present, 30 FAM L. Q. 245, 262-63 n.
58 (1996) (citing FRANK F. FURTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED
FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART 107-08 (1991)); Holly
L. Robinson, Joint Custody: Constitutional Imperatives, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 27, 33
(1985) ("One argument is that joint custody increases the potential for parental
conflict by requiring continued interaction between persons who have divorced.").
279 See WARSHAK supra note 1, at 203-04. A structured and precise joint custody
agreement could reduce the necessity for parents to communicate and negotiate on
a regular basis, resulting in autonomy for each parent when the children are at that
parent's home. See id. at 203-05. Dr. Warshak opines that joint custody is so benefi-
cial that parents should work hard to overcome the difficulties that may exist. See
id. at 203-05. He cites a study in which only one percent of those parents engaged in
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As previously suggested, alternating homes on a frequent
basis may also be difficult for children, suggesting that the ar-
rangement should provide that they spend extended periods with
each parent, rather than short alternating periods.' 0 If the chil-
dren's distress is extreme, joint physical custody may be inap-
propriate.281
Although there are difficulties associated with joint physical
custody, especially the parents' relationship, its overwhelming
benefits should be able to surmount these difficulties and make
the arrangement work. 2 When a couple seeks a divorce, it is
from one another, not their children. The law should recognize
that both parents need to maintain contact with their children.
Ideally, laws should encourage maximum fulfillment of a par-
ent's responsibilities to their children and themselves. Imple-
menting a joint custody regime as the norm in custody disputes
may decrease the problems associated with fatherless children,
who are prone to lead more dangerous lives.' Implementing a
joint custody approach may also encourage recognition that pa-
rental obligations do not end with divorce.
B. The Impact of Joint Custody Effects: Men, Women, and
Children
Fathers increasingly favor joint custody, and some fathers'
groups are working to increase recognition of joint custody across
the United States to enhance paternal custody options and thus
improve contact with their children.' Joint custody arrange-
ments allow men to spend more time with their children, de-
creasing the likelihood that shallow father-child relationships,
joint custody arrangements "dropped out of their children's lives" as compared to
almost eighteen percent of parents who stopped seeing their children in sole custody
arrangements. Id. at 203. Children of divorce need a great deal of encouragement
and reassurance about their parents' love for them; ensuring that they maintain
meaningful contact with both parents is one way to reinforce these feelings. See id.
2w See id. at 193-94 (discussing problems children have with alternating homes).
281 See TERKEL, supra note 14, at 21-22 (depicting various difficult situations for
children in a joint custody arrangement). Such children may experience confusion
about their daily schedules and may leave belongings with one parent that they
need when staying with the other. See id.
282 See WARS-AK, supra note 1, at 201 (noting that social pressures significantly
impact on parental decisions in such matters).
283 See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 49 (discussing the problems of fatherless chil-
dren).
28 See id. at 51.
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common to sole maternal custody awards will develop.2 Sys-
tematic contact permits fathers to be more involved in their chil-
dren's overall life and growth.28 Fathers can continue to share
routine activities, instead of being relegated to being a "Disney-
land Daddy." 7 Fathers' presence during their children's nega-
tive experiences helps to strengthen their relationship.' Joint
custody fathers also feel less loss, guilt, and loneliness than non-
custodial fathers.29 Most fathers in these arrangements relish
their ability to drive their children to various after-school activi-
ties, and to make decisions regarding their children's education,
religion, and health issues.290
Of course, it is important to remember that joint custodial
fathers normally possess more obligations than non-custodial fa-
thers. Not all men (or women) are capable of performing, or
willing to accept, these child-rearing obligations; however, those
who are capable can become accustomed to the role.291  Fathers
who share in their children's custody may experience financial
setbacks due to the cost of rearing the children, and may be
forced to pass-up career advancement opportunities.29 Similarly,
2 See WARSHAIK, supra note 1, at 180 (stating that it is impossible to fit two
weeks worth of someone's life into a two-day visit). Fathers are less likely to have
quality conversations with their children if they are only together a few hours a
week or month. See id
21 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 180 ("A father with custody can tell you the
difference between his son's mood on a school morning and a Saturday morning.").
See id.; Goldberg supra note 8, at 48 (discussing "Disneyland Daddys" and
fathers' need to be social coordinators for children when they visit them for short
durations in sole custody arrangements).
288 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 180. Fathers have stated that having a nor-
mal relationship with their children is impossible if they remain insulated from eve-
ryday obligations. See id. Fathers and children need to experience negative interac-
tions as "a necessary part of any real relationship." Id.
2 See id. at 180-81 ("The little pleasures of friendship and affection with a child
pop up at any time .... ).
28 See id. at 181. Fathers enjoy helping their children during times of despair,
in addition to celebrating with them when they achieve their goals. See id. Dr. War-
shak suggests that fathers engaged in joint custody will admit that the work they
put forth is worth the rewards received. See id
291 See id. Fathers granted joint custody assume not only the benefits, but also
the hindrances and duties of rearing their children. See id. ("[Tihe rewards of child-
rearing are often overshadowed by the daily hassles and conflicts.").
2 See id. Fathers with shared custody may also be required to take-off from
work more often, and arrange for child care when the children are home from
school. See id. Fathers may need time and room to adjust to these lifestyle changes.
See id. Most fathers undertaking the responsibilities of joint custody, learn to per-
form as effective parents by responding to their children's needs. See id.
569
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joint custody fathers typically must rearrange their schedules to
coincide with their children's.293 Despite these obstacles, fathers
who choose to accept the challenge generally tend to be happy
with their decision.
Some women's groups favor the use of the primary caretaker
doctrine and awards of sole custody over joint custody awards.
Under the primary caretaker standard, women generally receive
sole custody of the children.295 These women value their custody
stronghold, and therefore disfavor joint custody arrangements.296
Women in shared custody arrangements relinquish some of the
power and control they would have possessed under sole custody
arrangements.97 Unfortunately, the frightening possibility of
losing this power has led some women to refuse joint custody, or
to make its operation impossible in cases where the court has
granted it. 298  This defeats the purpose of joint custody, i.e., it
Generally, joint custody costs more financially than sole custody. See Melli &
Brown, supra note 117, at 554. This is primarily because joint custody requires
double ownership of household items. See id. A father may experience greater fi-
nancial hardship in a joint custody arrangement than if he was merely paying fixed
child support in a sole custody arrangement. See id. at 554-56. This is because the
joint custody father is responsible for the everyday expenses of his children when
they are with him. See id. For a more in-depth discussion of the relationship be-
tween finances and joint custody, see id. at 553-71.
See WARSHAK supra note 1, at 181-82.
See id. For the most part, fathers believe that the benefits of joint custody
"far outweigh the drawbacks," offering greater happiness and satisfaction in their
lives, and a sense that their children are benefiting as well. Id.
25 See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 48.
2m See id.; Abraham, supra note 6, at 50. These beliefs held by women's groups
are quite contradictory to their overall platforms because they tend to perpetuate
the very stereotypes that women have been fighting against for years-that women
are the "nurturers" and men the "breadwinners." See id. at 48, 51. Although joint
custody provides women with more freedom to pursue a career by allowing them to
split the responsibility of raising their children with the children's father, women's
groups generally oppose joint custody arrangements. See id. at 51. The groups took
this stance to confront existing societal discrimination. See id. Specifically, the idea
that women are superior at child rearing tends to provide women with an edge over
men that is absent elsewhere in our society. See id. Additionally, women who de-
cline custody frequently suffer a backlash for relinquishing their children. See
WARSHAK supra note 1, at 106-124. But see Levy, supra note 64, at 5 (considering
that the woman's movement has led men to assume a greater role in child-rearing,
as more women enter the workplace).
297 See WARSHAIK, supra note 1, at 185. In sole custody arrangements, mothers
are free to unilaterally decide about their children's education, religion, and medical
treatment, in addition to overseeing the children's daily activities. See id. However,
"[elven the mother who retains legal custody and shares only physical custody gives
up authority over her children during the times they are not in her possession." Id.
2' See id.
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could cause the father-child relationship to suffer irrevocably.299
Mothers who do not work outside the home feel the need to
preserve their full time jobs as mothers, and sharing custody
may cause them to experience a sense of loss during the time the
children are with their father."' Some women disfavor joint cus-
tody because the practical requirement that the father live
nearby will limit their choice of residency."' In other cases,
women may fight joint custody simply to punish their ex-
302spouse, an unfortunate occurrence that may harm the children
more than the ex-husband.
Nevertheless, women generally accept the idea of joint legal
custody. Unlike a sole custodial parent arrangement, it offers
relief from the overwhelming burdens associated with raising a
child alone.03 Joint custody affords women greater opportunities
to pursue goals outside the realm of wife, homemaker, and
mother, which may include attending college or pursuing differ-
ent career paths.3 As a result, the woman's job qualifications
and financial position may improve."5 Raising children is physi-
cally and emotionally demanding, and the stress-level can esca-
late when the duties are performed alone. Women with joint
custody often flourish during the time that their children are
29 See id. at 185-86. Some women simply want to ensure that the father acts
subject to her discretion. See id.00 See id. at 186. These mothers may feel that they have already lost their
"status as wivels]" and if forced to share their children, even for only a short time,
they may lose their sense of place in society. Id. To overcome these barriers, it is
suggested that women find other sources of fulfillment while caring for their chil-
dren's well-being. See id.
3 0 See id. at 187-88. Generally, for joint physical custody arrangements to suc-
ceed the parents need to live near each other. See id. at 204. In some circumstances,
this may be a selfish attempt to retain sole custody, in other instances it may be a
genuine fear that the father will hurt or kidnap the children. See id. at 188.
3'2 See id. (noting this may occur in cases where the woman feels abandoned by
her husband and consequently seeks revenge).
303 See id. at 183 (describing the child-rearing responsibilities that women in
sole custody situations imdertake).
304 See id. at 182, 184. Describing the benefits of joint custody, one mother was
described as commenting, 'Tm a better mother because I'm not a mother all the
time." Id. at 184. Joint custody ensures that mothers will have assistance in rearing
their children and that the children will have a more involved father. See id. Moth-
ers may also have greater opportunities to develop social relationships with men.
See id.
300 See Melli & Brown, supra note 117, at 554-55. Similar to the financial strains
of shared custody on men, there may be increased expenses placed on women. Ordi-
narily, women who do not have sole custody of the children are not required to be
financially responsible for the children's daily expenses. See id.
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with their fathers, providing them with a needed break and a
chance to regroup."'6 In addition, women sharing custody acquire
the benefit of another person's opinion when making child-
rearing decisions.0 7 Joint custody increases the probability that
women will receive assistance in the raising of their children, as
well as a right to expect responsibility from the children's fa-
ther.08
Finally, the effects that joint custody has on children war-
rants consideration. Research demonstrates that children in
joint custody situations have greater self-esteem than those in
sole-custody.39 Not only do these children experience fewer
doubts about their father's lack of involvement, but they also feel
less guilt for the divorce than children in sole custody arrange-
ments.10 Children in joint custody also feel less apprehensive
about their parents' divorce, and they are typically more satis-
fied with their living arrangements than sole-custody children.311
Joint custody parents tend to be more amiable toward each
other, creating a better atmosphere for the children.312
Joint custody also permits children greater contact with both
parents. Under joint physical custody, the bonds between par-
ents and their children strengthen because the children actually
live with both parents for some period of time.13 Children rec-
'06 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 183-84.
307 See id. at 184 ("Parents with joint legal custody continue to make.., deci-
sions together."). The mother is no longer solely responsible for the physical and
emotional care of her children. See id. at 183-84.
'3 See id. at 184; Abraham, supra note 6, at 50 (describing the results of a study
that found that father's with shared custody proved to be significantly more reliable
in meeting their child support obligations).
309 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 196-98 (accepting the findings of one study
finding children's self-esteem higher in joint custody situations than in sole custody
arrangements); Friedman, supra note 253, at 652 (considering the rewards for chil-
dren's well-being from joint custody, in spite of the sacrifices parents must make to
fulfill the arrangement).
310 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 196-97. When a father fails to visit his chil-
dren in a sole custody situation, many children believe their actions warded him off.
See id. at 197.
311 See id. ("Joint custody boys, in particular, had fewer negative experiences to
report about the divorce and its aftermath than did mother-custody boys.").
312 See id. (noting that children in joint custody were more satisfied with their
living arrangements and that joint custody enables them to develop a close relation-
ship with both parents). Additionally, "Uloint custody children experience[ more
cooperation between their parents, less violence, more contact with both parents,
and more geographical stability." Id. at 198.
313 See id. at 199.
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ognize that they can ask either parent for advice and regularly
share good news with both.314 In some ways, the children's de-
velopment will be unaltered, because there are two parents in-
volved in their lives, as there was before the divorce.315
Yet, some suggest that joint custody can create several
problems for children. For example, some critics believe that
joint custody will increase the hostilities between the parents,
leaving the children in the middle of their parents' struggles for
control and power.316 Another criticism is that joint custody ac-
tually confuses the children and "undermines their sense of se-
curity and stability."37 Those who advocate joint custody, how-
ever, argue that sole custody is more responsible for increasing
children's senses of inconsistency by "disrupt[ing] the relation-
ship between [the] child and noncustodial parent."3 18 Joint cus-
tody arrangements are not the answer in all circumstances, but
they presumably are for most families.
C. Suggestion That Joint Custody is the Best Option for All Those
Involved
The benefits of a presumption for joint custody warrant that
it should exist in all states. The presumption in favor of joint
custody should be both cultural and legal, but in effect, the one
creates the other. This was the case with the tender years doc-
314 See id. at 196-98; see also Kearney, supra note 41, at 556 (noting that the
trauma of divorce faced by the child is reduced by joint custody because the child
may develop valuable relationships with both parents).3'5 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 196-98. Since joint legal custody permits chil-
dren to have profound contact with both their parents, it provides children with
greater affection and support. See Kearney, supra note 41, at 555-56.
316 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 191; Goldberg, supra note 8, at 51. There are
those, however, who contend that joint custody actually results in less hostility be-
tween the parents because they are sharing their rights and responsibilities some-
what equally. See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 191-92.
317 WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 193. Unfortunately, many judges and lawyers es-
pouse this view, either discouraging joint custody or denying it altogether. See
Abraham, supra note 6, at 50 (stating that many men who would prefer joint cus-
tody arrangements are dissuaded from pursing them based on their attorney's ad-
vice).
Of course, some children would have a difficult time adjusting to the changes in
environment, but these children have been found to be in the minority, and their
reasons for anxiety and confusion may result from factors other than their custody
arrangement. See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 194-95. It is important to remember
that all children are unique and handle situations differently. See id.
3"' WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 193. These people suggest that the consistence of
the relationship, not the environment, is more crucial for children. See id.
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trine. A legal presumption helped perpetuate the belief in
American society that the mother was the nurturer and thus the
proper caretaker of her children, and the father was the one who
worked and earned money to support his family.3 19 That legal
presumption began, however, with the cultural belief that moth-
ers belonged at home with the children and fathers at work.2 '
The legal presumption fostered these long-held beliefs, and in
essence perpetuated them.32" '
A presumption of joint custody could help society recognize,
culturally and legally, that children need both parents present in
their lives, and that such an arrangement is the natural result of
a divorce. 322 That there is a strong presumption in favor of ma-
ternal custody today, and that such arrangements are considered
the norm, is evidenced by the overwhelming number of sole ma-
ternal-custody homes in America."n A legal presumption in favor
of joint custody, however, would begin to correct this problem,
making shared custody the appropriate post-divorce arrange-
ment. 3 24 Instituting such a legal presumption could lead to a cul-
tural belief that parents should continue in their co-parenting
roles after divorce.32 A joint custody presumption would not re-
quire all divorced parents to share custody, but would help joint
custody to emerge as the predominant choice for custody ar-
rangements, and eliminate society's suspicions about joint cus-
tody.326 Parents would still have the choice not to participate in a
joint custody arrangement, but they would also have the oppor-
tunity to do so, without having to overcome burdensome hur-
dles. 27
319 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (discussing legal presumption
in favor of maternal custody).
320 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (discussing tender years doc-
trine and its stereotypical ideals).
321 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the current legal use of
tender years doctrine).
2 See WARSHAI, supra note 1, at 201.
m See id. (noting that ninety percent of divorced families adhere to this pre-
sumption, resulting in mother-custody homes).
.24 See id. at 201-02. "People who now censure the divorced mother who 'gives
up her children' would instead criticize the mother who deprives her children of a
meaningful relationship with their father.. . ." Id. at 202.
32 See id. at 201.
326 See id. at 202 (noting that a presumption of joint custody could very well re-
move the issue of custody from the arsenal of divorce warfare).
37 See id. Families would also have the opportunity to arrange their agreements
in the manner they see fit, and, of course, run their households as they wanted. See
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Parents' and children's ability to maintain meaningful rela-
tionships that develop in a mutually-beneficial manner is ex-
tremely important." Logistical problems may cause difficulties,
but these can, and should, be overcome to preserve these vital
relationships.
Under a joint custody regime, children are not forced to
choose between one of their parents, because they have the op-
portunity to maintain substantial contact with both.32 9 Further-
more, with joint custody presumed to be in the best interest of
the children, judges would have fewer opportunities to inject
their own biases, through application of the best interests or
primary caretaker standards.
Moreover, joint custody may benefit society as well. Chil-
dren who have more contact with their fathers tend to develop
more favorably and are typically better able to contribute to soci-
ety.13' Research indicates that there is a correlation between this
lack of contact and increased rates of "teen suicide, substance
abuse, crime, runaways," and other afflictions.3 ' This would
suggest that children under joint custody, whose fathers would
be more present in their lives, would be less susceptible to these
problems.
Additionally, research suggests that when they maintain
contacts and involvement with their children, parents are more
willing to assume financial responsibility for them.332 Joint cus-
id. Joint custody would simply permit children to be raised jointly by both parents,
but in different households. See id.
28 See id. at 134 (discussing factors that cushion the experience of divorce for
children). Fathers are generally more involved in their children's lives and feel a
greater sense of self-worth as a result ofjoint custody arrangements. See id. at 180-
82. Mothers typically experience less stress and have broader opportunities than
they would in sole custody arrangements. See id. at 183-84. The women's movement
enabled women to pursue higher goals for themselves, and joint custody provides
more freedom for them to continue doing so. See id.
329 See Friedman, supra note 253, at 652. Asking a child to decide which parent
to live with creates an impossible situation for the child. See id.
o See generally Ross D. PARKE, FATHERS, 89-91 (1981) (exploring the impor-
tance of continuing paternal contact for the development of a child).
33 Goldberg supra note 8, at 49.
332 See Abraham, supra note 6, at 50-51. See generally Melli & Brown, supra
note 117, at 549-50 (discussing the economic reality of joint custody arrangements).
Failure to pay child support is the most frequently committed crime in this country
today. See CHAMBERS, supra note 2, at 17. In 1987 child support defaults exceeded
$4.6 billion, and the total amount of child support due was $14.6 billion. See id. at
18. There presently exist both civil and criminal remedies for those who do not re-
ceive child support payments. See JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHILD SUPPORT IN
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tody increases the likelihood of parents maintaining such con-
tacts, and would presumably reduce the incidents of child sup-
port delinquencies. Others suggest that joint custody, by remov-
ing the burdens and expenses placed on mothers with sole
custody, would help rid society of the single mother underclass
that presently exists under the sole maternal custody regime.333
Joint custody agreements create a situation that is most
comparable to the family structure before divorce. Children con-
tinue to maintain their relationships with both parents, and it is
even possible that the increased one-on-one relationship they ex-
perience with each parent will nurture their parent-child rela-
tionships. Both parents remain responsible for their children,
with each having a duty to both discipline and congratulate
them. Perhaps the only real difference in the children's lives af-
ter divorce, and the imposition of joint custody, is that the chil-
dren are less exposed to the arguing and hostility that was pres-
ent before the divorce. Without such exposure, the children will
mature in a more holistic family lifestyle, with two adults to care
for them and to address their best interests." It is arguable,
however, that joint custody tries to restore a family structure
AMERICA 18-19 (1986). For a thorough discussion of how better to enforce and re-
ceive money from delinquent child support payers, see LIEBERMAN, supra, at 77-90.
Understandably, non-custodial parents denied visitation may be reluctant to
sign a support check. See Karen Czapanskiy, Child Support and Visitation: Rethink-
ing the Connections, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 619, 619 (1989). However, this may backfire
on the parent as courts could legally deny visitation to a parent who fails to pay the
required child support. See id. For an in-depth discussion of the connections be-
tween child support and visitation, and several proposed solutions, see Czapanskiy,
supra, at 658-665. In one study, it was found that over a five year period, fathers
who had regular, satisfactory contact with their children were more likely to pay
child support that those who did not. See id.; LIEBERMAN, supra at 17. Therefore, it
may logically be concluded that granting non-custodial parents more access to their
children increases their willingness to pay child support. It seems to follow that the
more emotional contact the non-custodial parent has with the children, the more
likely he or she will be to support them financially. See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 52
("If you're not involved emotionally, there's no motivation to stay involved finan-
cially."). Joint custody allows parents to have greater contact with their children,
therefore, theoretically, decreasing the potential for child support delinquency. See
id.
= See Stark, supra note 14, at 1526 ("Because of their assumption of devalued
nurturing responsibilities, women lack the money, status, power, as well as the in-
stitutional or organizational support necessary for meaningful access to, and par-
ticipation in, the public sphere.").
334 See Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 65-66 (N.J. 1981) (stating that best interests
of child are disserved by sole custody and discussing numerous benefits of joint cus-
tody).
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that simply has ceased to exist.35  Divorce alters familial rela-
tionships, particularly that of the parents, but the argument that
joint custody requires parents to create a facade that their bro-
ken relationship still exists, is unfounded.336
Another advantage of joint custody over sole custody ar-
rangements is that it allows two parents, rather than just one, to
contribute to the rearing of the children. Two parents brought
the children into the world and two must help them survive in
the world; both parents must retain responsibility for the chil-
dren throughout their lives. 37 There are things that one parent
can bestow upon his or her children that the other cannot, and
joint custody permits the children to reap the benefits of both
parents' qualities, as well as to learn from both parents' mis-
takes.
38
Joint custody can also be beneficial in reducing gender
stereotypes that are often behind existing child custody deci-
sions. It is true that statutes and judge-made laws dictate that
custody decisions occur without reference to a party's gender, 39
but in reality, gender is a factor in all aspects of our society, in-
cluding custody decisions. The growing use of the primary care-
taker standard is a reversion back to the tender years doctrine of
the nineteenth century." It is a disguised attempt to award
women custody simply because they are women. Society, in ef-
fect, encourages women to remain at home or to provide more of
the care for their children than men, resulting in overwhelming
custody awards to women under the primary caretaker regime." I
Joint custody grants both parents meaningful contact with their
children, regardless of their gender, and it relieves women of the
scorn and criticism they would have experienced if they had re-
linquished their children to their father's sole custody. 2 By as-
3" See Kearney, supra note 41, at 561. Joint custody, it has been said, ignores
the fact that a family structure fell apart and resulted in divorce. See id.
"' See id. Some have argued that joint custody refuses to recognize that
"parents' attitudes and priorities change after [they] divorce." Id.
"7 See Friedman, supra note 253, at 652.
38 See generally supra notes 140, 297 and accompanying text (discussing the
needs of children that are met by their parents).
"' See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing gender-neutral laws
and child custody).
340 See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 51; Kearney, supra note 41, at 558-59.
34' See Kearney, supra note 41, at 558-59.
342 See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 121-22 (discussing double standard experi-
enced by women who relinquish custody). From society's viewpoint, a husband who
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suming both parents can equally provide for their children, re-
gardless of gender, joint custody is truly a gender-neutral ap-
proach. Joint custody is the only custody arrangement that hon-
estly recognizes that children need both parents involved in their
lives and development, and affords them this opportunity.
Not only does joint custody remove gender barriers to men
serving as effective fathers, it reduces the financial strain
women experience as sole custody parents and permits them
more autonomy. 43 Shared custody allows women to maintain
contact with their children while creating the opportunity to
achieve goals aside from child-rearing.' Furthermore, sole cus-
tody perpetuates the stereotypical ideas that men are not suited
for child-rearing, and that women must stay at home with the
children. Such stereotypes may inhibit young girls from pursu-
ing various goals and gathering the necessary education and
training, based on the belief that they have no place in the public
sphere. 5 Feminism promoted the belief that men need to as-
sume more of the child-rearing responsibilities, but by promoting
sole custody, feminism is releasing men from this responsibility,
and again placing it exclusively on women. In effect, sole cus-
tody requires women to stay home full-time or take jobs that al-
low sufficient time for child care, which typically are less psycho-
logically and/or financially satisfying. 6
Critics argue, however, that joint custody is not entirely
beneficial for men. Some believe that "residual animosity dooms
most joint custody arrangements," and as a result, men should
fight only for sole custody.37 Others state that single fathers ex-
perience significant backlash from others, making their attempts
at good parenting more difficult. 8  Finally, critics argue that
leaves his wife and family is deemed an "irresponsible child" that is "running away,"
while a mother who does the same is considered a "monster." Stark, supra note 14,
at 1509. Even if the mother relinquishes custody for propitious reasons, it is viewed
in a negative light. See id.
m See WARSHAK, supra note 1, at 184. This is not to suggest, however, that
women should simply relinquish all custodial responsibilities to better themselves or
that children are detrimental to a woman's well-being or achievement. See id.
m See id.
34 See Stark, supra note 14, at 1525.
' See Abraham, supra note 6, at 51 (stating that feminist opposition to joint
custody is actually contradictory to their original platforms and ideals).
S47 Goldberg, supra note 8, at 49 (noting some fathers groups, such as Dads
Against Discrimination, oppose joint custody arrangements).
See Levy, supra note 64, at 7. Fathers frequently encounter prejudice at
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since a mother may have had more child-raising duties during
the marriage, forcing her to share those duties after a divorce
because the father now wants to participate in raising his chil-
dren, is unfair.349 Such critics contend "that joint custody's
rhetoric of gender equality does not reflect the way that labor is
divided between men and women."35 Yet, such criticisms ignore
the changing dynamics of familial relationships today.
VII. CONCLUSION
In an ideal world people would stay married forever, chil-
dren would continue to live with both parents, and there would
be no need for child custody decisions. Unfortunately, we do not
live in an ideal world, and custody decisions are necessary. So-
cietal changes have altered parental roles. Custody decisions
should reflect those societal changes, and should no longer dis-
criminate against fathers. Children should not lose the benefits
of interacting with both parents and experiencing a more holistic
family life simply because their parents divorce. Joint custody
affords fathers the opportunity to maintain meaningful relation-
ships with their children and provides needed assistance in re-
ducing the existing disparity between custody awards to men
and women. Furthermore, joint custody children are given the
opportunity to mature with both parents' help, guidance, and
love. Joint custody, despite its limited shortcomings, is a bene-
ficial form of child custody that our courts should adopt with
more frequency. Such custody arrangements may, in many
situations, be the closest thing possible to utopia.
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childcare facilities as well as from other people informally assisting in the children's
care. See id. They are often asked where the mother is, and some professionals keep
a special lookout for "emotional disturbance, poor nutrition, and ill health" in chil-
dren living with single fathers. Id.; see also WARSHAR, supra note 1, at 101
(discussing the social biases single fathers face).
' 9 See Kearney, supra note 41, at 556-57.
30 Id. at 557.
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